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SUMMARY 
This thesis presents tax minimisation strategies, how multinational companies use them and what 
regulations and actions that international policymakers and national governments use to tackle 
aggressive tax planning. Theories and relevant literature are used to describe and confirm the use 
of these strategies by multinational companies. 
 Focusing on Microsoft, various tax minimisation strategies are used by this company to 
minimise and even avoid the tax liabilities. By exploiting the loopholes in the U.S. and inter-
national tax regulations, Microsoft is able to avoid U.S. withholding tax and tax on the income 
passive. Their international operations and geographic locations are structured for the tax 
minimisation purpose.  Internationally, Microsoft uses the operation centres in Singapore, Ireland 
and Puerto Rico to transfer the intellectual property rights and to retain the foreign income 
outside the United States avoiding the U.S. withholding tax. Using disregarded CFC entities, 
Microsoft shifts the intellectual property between the subsidiaries in the low-tax jurisdictions 
without being taxed. Microsoft manages to "bring" back the foreign income to the United States 
untaxed through investment in the U.S. financial markets done by the foreign subsidiaries. 
Double Irish Dutch sandwich is also used to channel the profits further to Bermuda. Microsoft 
operation in Norway seems to be used for the tax purpose as it is financed by debt and is loaded 
with high operating costs. There is also an indication that Microsoft shifts the revenue from North 
America to Norway. The sales from Norwegian market are booked in Ireland through 
Luxembourg. Even though there are value-added activities in Norway, Microsoft claims that 
there is none and due to residency-based tax regulations, only six percent of the total sales in 
Norwegian market are recognised as taxable income in Norway. Lack of transparency due to the 
use of tax havens increases the conviction of aggressive tax planning done by Microsoft. 
 Microsoft's business model involving intellectual property is one step ahead of the existing 
tax regulations. Some actions have been taken to mitigate any practices of exploiting the existing 
regulations. Future development seems promising as more countries are involved. 
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FOREWORD 
This thesis is written as a part of the master study in Financial Economics at Norwegian School 
of Economics and master study in International Management (CEMS).  
 Master thesis is a valuable opportunity for a student to immerse in a self-chosen academic 
topic. The choice of the topic for this thesis was based on personal interest in tax planning done 
by multinational companies, especially technological companies. The academic interest was 
developed during the participation in the Taxes and Business Strategy course, in which Guttorm 
Schjelderup and Dirk Schindler delivered the academic background and real problems in the 
taxation issue in a challenging way. In addition, endless media attention and changing business 
models done by technological companies strengthened the choice. Most importantly, there is a 
huge motivation that the topic will be interesting, actual and important both for academics and 
today's society in Norway and international. 
 My gratitude is addressed to Guttorm Schjelderup for the valuable and constructive inputs 
and feedback, Tax Justice Network, and Norwegian Tax Administration. 
 
Bergen, June 19, 2015 
Susana Anggraeni 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Profit shifting and tax planning are never-ending topics and still a focus in the media. The atten-
tion toward multinational companies doing profit shifting, especially the U.S. companies opera-
ting abroad, raises questions on the necessity to review the tax and revenue regulations and how 
governments can mitigate this practice, while at the same time maintaining their country's 
competitive advantage in terms of tax regulations in the international perspective. On the other 
hand, many countries’ revenues depend on the taxes paid by these companies. The absence of or 
significant decrease in tax revenues from multinational companies will affect the welfare condi-
tion and to some extent forces the government to increase the taxes for domestic companies. This 
policy is burdensome for the citizens and increases the criticism to the tax regulations in the 
international level.  
 Multinational companies, in particular technological companies, utilise the existing tax and 
revenue regulations across the border to minimise their tax payment in the countries they are 
operating. This practice is not easy to justify from the legal side as the advance tax planning is 
considered by some to be the practice of tax avoidance, which is illegal; while some argue that 
the tax planning is in accordance with the regulations in the countries concerned, i.e. legal.. 
 The media has been showing its attention to companies such Amazon, Google and Face-
book. Baker's (2013) article mentions that Apple Inc. paid only two percent tax on income of $74 
billion; Google Inc. who generated $18 billion of revenue in Britain from 2006 to 2011, paid only 
$16 million in taxes; and Vodafone Group Plc. had managed to gradually reduce the tax payment, 
and paid almost no tax to British taxman in the last 16 years. 
 Concerning with the aforementioned issues, this thesis will describe and discuss the tax 
planning methods/strategies that multinational companies use in common and how they use them. 
Studies on relevant literature and empirical analysis are expected to be able to answer and explain 
some of these problems. 
 Focus of this thesis is Microsoft and its operations, both internationally and within Norway. 
The purpose is to give a more real example on how a multinational company, particularly techno-
logical company, does its tax planning to minimise or even avoid taxes. Microsoft had been under 
the radar compared to other American multinational technological companies until an investiga-
tion on its tax planning scheme by U.S. Senate HSGAC Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-
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gations released in September 2012. Since then, more publications and even an investigation by 
IRS regarding Microsoft transfer pricing for its intellectual properties (IPs) followed. 
 The thesis starts with theories on multinational company and its capital structure, followed 
by description of international tax codes and tax regulations in the United States, Ireland, 
Norway, and Singapore. Tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions are also reviewed. The next part is 
the presentation of tax minimisation strategies that multinational (technological) companies can 
do and the existing relevant literature to see how and to what extent these multinational 
companies utilise these strategies in their tax planning. Analysis of Microsoft’s tax planning is 
performed in order to see and find out whether what Microsoft has been doing is in accordance 
with the theory and empirical evidence found on tax minimisation. It is also interested to present 
and discuss how the company minimises its tax payment both globally and in Norway. In the last 
part, existing and upcoming government regulations regarding tax and revenue are presented. The 
effects and the possibility of tax regulation development to tackle tax avoidance, especially 
within OECD and internationally will be discussed. Interestingly, even thought the result is still 
unknown, positive attitude towards effort in mitigating tax avoidance also comes from some tax 
havens. 
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2. MULTINATIONAL COMPANY AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Theory on capital structure and how multinational companies choose the optimal capital structure 
will be the presented in this chapter.  
2.1. Multinational companies 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) defines multinational company as a company that engages in a 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and owns or, in some ways, controls value-added activities in 
more than one country. The degree of a company’s multinationality depends on the number and 
size of foreign affiliates, the number of countries in which it owns or controls the value-added 
activities, the proportion of its global assets, revenues and employment accounted for by its 
foreign affiliates, the extent to which its higher-value activities such as research and development 
(R&D) are internationalised, and other factors regarding ownership, management and financing, 
etc. Operating in many countries, a multinational is subject to multiple governances and tax 
jurisdictions, i.e. it must pay taxes to more than one countries. 
2.2. Capital structure in multinational companies 
Berk and DeMarzo (2011) point out that multinational companies’ capital structure consists of 
equity, debt and other securities. However, the most common choices to raise funds are financing 
through equity alone and financing through a combination of debt and equity. In the case that 
multinational companies need to raise funds from external investors, they have to decide which 
type of securities to be issued. In deciding the optimal capital structure, multinational companies 
take into account the affiliates worldwide in addition to the parent company. Optimal capital 
structure implies that multinational companies maximise the global profit, i.e. minimise the 
global costs (Møen et al, 2011). 
2.3. Tax-efficient capital structure 
In a perfect capital market, firms could use any combinations of debt and equity in financing the 
investment without changing the value of the firm. Using Law of One price, Berk and DeMarzo 
(2011) argue that leverage changes the allocation of cash flows between debt and equity, but it 
will not alter the total value of the firm.  
 However, the real capital market is imperfect and taxes are present. Corporate tax, 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡, 
changes the value of the firm because interest payments of debt can be deducted from taxable 
 
 
9 
  
corporate income, creating a valuable tax shield, 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷. This tax shield will decrease the interest 
payments, i.e. increase after-tax profits, π. In a firm that is financed by equity, E, and debt, D, the 
after-tax profit, π, can be expressed as: 
π = (1-𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡)[𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿] −  𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷  (2.1)  
where 𝐾𝐾 = 𝐸𝐸 + 𝐷𝐷 
Therefore, the value of a firm with leverage exceeds the value of unlevered firm due to the tax 
shield.  
 Unfortunately, the advantage of using the debt is limited due the increase risks of bankruptcy 
and its costs, direct and indirect. For this reason, the firms have to balance the bankruptcy costs 
against the tax gains to achieve an optimal capital structure (Miller and Merton, 1977).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 Further, Berk and DeMarzo (2011) mention that when raising external funds, firms seem to 
prefer debt, but not all investment is externally funded. Some firms support investment and 
growth by internally generated funds, such as retained earnings. In addition, there are large dif-
ferences in the net leverage across industries. Firms in growth industries, like high technology, 
carry very little debt and maintain large cash reserves. 
 For multinational companies, debt financing can be separated in to two sources: external and 
internal. It is optimal to use both types of debt to save taxes as their cost functions do not 
correlate to each other. Huizinga et al. (2008) and Egger et al. (2010) use total debt, i.e. the sum 
of internal and external debt, in their empirical analysis, and show that multinational firms have 
higher debt-to-asset ratio than domestic firms. This is the opportunity that domestic firms do not 
have as they can only access external debt. In addition, multinational companies can exploit the 
tax advantage more by shifting debt from affiliates in low-tax countries to affiliates in high-tax 
countries. Debt financing is also important for non-tax factor as it is a disciplining device for 
overspending managers (Møen et al, 2011). 
2.4. Trade off in tax-efficient capital structure. 
Møen et al (2011) model the tax-efficient capital structure of affiliates of multinational compa-
nies and show that there are three debt tax shield effects that multinational companies can use; 
the standard debt tax shield effect and two effects related to international debt shifting, namely 
external and internal debt shifting. The model starts with the economic profit in affiliate i: 
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𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝑒𝑒  = F(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) – w•𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 -[r + CE (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸) + CI (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼)] • 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 (2.2) 
where 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸= 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸/𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 is the external leverage and 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼/𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 is the internal leverage.  
 However, there is cost of using debt. External debt creates agency cost, CE (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸), due to 
excessive borrowing and higher risk of bankruptcy. Internal debt generates concealment cost,    
CI (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼), due to tax engineering expenses (e.g. hiring lawyers and tax experts) that incur in order to 
avoid or relax regulations such as thin capitalisation (TC) rules and/or controlled-foreign-
company (CFC) rules.  
 Overall bankruptcy cost at parent level of the multinational company, 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓, occurs when parent 
company guarantees the external debt of the affiliates, i.e. willing to bail out any affiliate facing 
bankruptcy. This cost depends on the firm-wide external debt-to-asset ratio, 𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓 = 
𝛴𝛴𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝐸𝐸
𝛴𝛴𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖
. The use of 
internal debt creates interest expenses in the borrowing affiliates and interest income in the len-
ding affiliate. The overall sum must be equal to zero (𝛴𝛴𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 • 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 = 0), as the total amount of interest 
expenses should show up with the exact amount as interest income in the lending affiliate, i.e. 
internal lending constraint.. As cost of equity is not deductible, the taxable profit in affiliate i: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡 = F(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) – w•𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 – r [𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼] - [CE (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸) + CI (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼)] • 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 (2.3) 
Deriving the world-wide profits, П𝑝𝑝= ∑ (𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) −  𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓, with respect to 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼, subject to 
internal lending constraint  and bankruptcy cost, results in the optimal capital structure: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 • 𝑟𝑟 = (1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) •  𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸(𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸)𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 +  𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓(𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓)𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓 • 1𝛴𝛴𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 > 0   for external debt, and   (2.4)     (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆) • 𝑟𝑟 = (1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) •  𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼(𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼)𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  , with λ = miniti = t1 for internal debt.   (2.5) 
 The equations imply that the capital structure is optimal when the marginal tax saving equals 
marginal cost of using (increasing) debt (external debt, eq. 2.4 and internal debt, eq. 2.5). The 
lending affiliate, i.e.  internal bank is always located in the lowest-taxed affiliate, i.e. country 1, in 
order to maximise internal debt tax shield. In addition, it is optimal to use both external and 
internal debt. If 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 is zero, the external leverage of the multinational companies will be the same 
as the leverage in the domestic firms, because there is no use of doing external debt shifting. 
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However, the affiliates of multinational companies will still have higher total leverage due to the 
internal borrowing.  
2.5. Multinational company structure and its financing structure. 
Grubert (2003) explains that multinational companies can be organised as corporations, branches, 
trusts and partnerships. A corporation is registered and incorporated in a country and issues 
shares to owners who have voting right and a claim to the profits and losses. However, the resi-
dence of the corporation is not based on where shareholders live, but instead based on where 
multinationals are incorporated or where they are managed and controlled. If the corporation 
operates with limited liability, the shareholders are not responsible for losses beyond the value of 
assets held in the corporation.  
 Branches are entities that do not have distinct legal character as they are parts of the 
operations of a corporation or partnership that derives profits from the branch and liable for all 
losses. Trusts are entities created by a person for beneficiaries who receive distributions of 
income and capital from the trust. Partnerships are companies that are jointly owned by investors 
– the partnership can be organised as limited liability partnership or not. 
 The way multinational companies structured depends on the usage of indirect financing 
structures. Normally, this business involves a corporate chain that is organised in groups with 
several tiers of ownership. Corporations set up multiple-tiered structures for a variety of reasons: 
to manage specific business separately for better management; to comply with government 
regulations that require separate entities to operate in a specific jurisdiction; and to reduce 
worldwide taxes for a multinational group especially with regard to corporate income tax and 
withholding tax. However, the types of multinational financial planning and tax policy affect the 
choice of financing structures (Mintz and Weichenrieder, 2010). 
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3. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM AND TAX CODES 
3.1. International corporate taxation 
As mentioned by Mintz and Weichenrieder (2008), international corporate taxation is focused on 
the treatment of outbound and inbound cross-border investments.  It means that there is a 
complexity regarding special rules, regulations and concepts, such as controlled foreign company 
(CFC) legislation, passive income, interest allocation, excess and deficient tax credits, deferral, 
per-country limitation and thin capitalisation (TC) limitation. Taxes that are particularly relevant 
to cross-border financing decisions are related to income. As cross-border investment has to cope 
with at least two jurisdictions and tax systems with different taxes on company income, there is 
an incentive for multinationals to shift income in far-from-transparent ways to low-taxed entities.   
3.2. International corporate tax system bases 
3.2.1. Residency 
The basis of taxation for a company connected to a jurisdiction depends on the critical concept of 
residency. Company residence is based on a legal connection, including place of incorporation 
and registration or economic or commercial connection such as effective or central management 
and control, tested by criteria such as where the board or the directors meet, where financial book 
are kept, etc. Differences in the tax treatment of residency status across countries can result in 
some anomalies giving rise to tax complexity and opportunities for tax planning.  
3.2.2. Separate Accounting principles and Formula Apportionment  
Separate Accounting, SA, and Formula Apportionment, FA, are the most used systems for taxa-
tion of profits of multinational companies for many countries. Out of these two, SA is the most 
common one. Under SA, total income by the multinational companies is divided among its affi-
liates based on each affiliate’s accounts and the application of an arm’s length pricing standard 
for intra-firm transactions. However, the price in intra-firm transactions is not easy to observe in 
the market. Therefore, SA does not reduce the incentive for multinational companies to shift 
income to the country with the lowest tax income rate by under-/over-invoicing the intra-firm 
transactions (Schjelderup, 2013). 
 FA, in the other hand, is perceived to limit the incentive of using transfer pricing to shift 
profits into low-tax countries as this system allocates the tax liabilities based on the apportion of 
assets, sales, and/payroll in each affiliate. The use of apportion system makes the amount of total 
 
 
13 
  
tax liabilities unchanged even though the multinational companies try to shift profits by transfer 
pricing. Under FA, however, firms can still shift profits to low-tax countries by adjusting their 
activities and thus, the weight that apportions profits to the low-tax countries. When a multi-
national company operates in an oligopoly market and uses decentralised decision-making, a 
subsidiary can decide the quantity in local markets while the parent firm decides the transfer 
price. If the parent firm sets a low transfer price to the subsidiary, the subsidiary becomes a low 
cost firm and it can sell in large quantity. In doing so, a larger share of profits is shifted and taxed 
in the low-tax countries. It implies that transfer pricing is not only used as an instrument to shift 
profits, but it also has a strategic value. Even though under certain circumstances, e.g. as 
explained, FA can create distortion in price and firms' activities, it is still favourable to curb 
transfer pricing (Nielsen, Raimondos-Møller and Schjelderup, 2001).  
3.3. Double taxation treaties 
Double taxation is defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two (or more) tax jurisdic-
tions on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject and for identical periods. It has harmful 
effects on the international exchange of goods and service and cross-border movements of 
capital, technology and persons. Therefore, there is a need to eliminate this obstacle. OECD's 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital provides guidance to solve this problem, and it 
is continuously updated to any new tax issues in the global economy (OECD, 2014). 
 To avoid this double taxation problem, exemption method and credit method are used. 
Huizinga et al (2009) explain the methods as follows. Consider a multinational company with 
parent company p and a subsidiary located in host country s. Both home and host countries can 
tax the subsidiary’s income. First, the host country may levy a corporate income tax at rate ts on 
subsidiary's income. Next, the host country levies a non-resident dividend withholding tax at rate 
ws on the subsidiary’s net-of-corporate-tax income upon repatriation of this income to the parent 
countries. The effective tax rate for the dividend is: 
1 - (1 - ts )(1 - ws) or ts + ws - tsws (3.1) 
as the dividend is taxed twice, first as an income and second as a dividend.  
 Using an exemption system, when the dividend is repatriated, it is not taxed in the parent 
country as it is already taxed in the host country - assuming that the exemption is full. Thus, the 
overall international rate of taxation on the subsidiary’s income is the same as expression (3.1). 
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However, home country can tax the worldwide income of its multinational companies and subject 
the received dividend to corporate income taxation at rate tp. If there is no double taxation relief 
at all, the dividend brought to the parent country will be taxed at rate tp. It implies that the 
effective tax rate becomes the accumulation of tax in the host country and in the parent country:  
ts + ws - tsws + tp (3.2) 
 Some countries apply an indirect tax credit system where both the corporate tax and the 
withholding tax paid in the host country are credited against the home corporate income tax. If 
the home country’s corporate tax, tp, is higher than the overall host country tax rate, the firm pays 
income tax in the home country at rate tp - [ts + ws - tsws], i.e. the rest of tax amount that has not 
been paid in the host country due to lower tax rate. On the other hand, if the home country’s 
corporate income tax rate is lower than the overall host country’s rate, the firm is in excess of 
foreign tax credit, and will not pay tax in the home country. In this case, the combined, effective 
tax rate is then ts + ws - tsws. With indirect tax credit system, the combined, effective tax rate is: 
max [tp ; ts + ws - tsws] (3.3) 
It implies that the firm has to pay effective tax rate that is equal or more than the home country 
tax rate.  
  Some home countries employ direct tax credit system and restrict the foreign tax credit to 
cover only host country non-resident withholding taxes. The multinational, then, has to pay tax in 
the parent country to the extent that tp exceeds ws, so that the effective tax rate is ts + (1 – ts) 
max[tp, ws].   
 Most countries have bilateral tax treaties to eliminate the double taxation of income, provide 
a basis for the exchange of information and dispute resolution among tax authorities, and agree to 
share of tax revenues by negotiating reduction in withholding tax, rates on dividends, interest, 
royalties and other cross-border flows of income (Mintz and Weichenrieder, 2008). 
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3.4. Deferred tax system 
Dividends remitted to the parent company are subject to tax by the home country. Assuming no 
withholding tax on dividends, the home country tax payment for the remitted dividends is equal 
to tdD(1−tf) , where D is dividends paid by the subsidiary to the parent; td refers to corporate tax rate 
in the home country; and tf refers to corporate tax rate in the foreign country. The foreign tax 
credit is equal to the corporate income taxes deemed to be paid on distributed profits, d�Ff�Kf� −rBf�tf, where d refers to the dividend payout ratio of the subsidiary; Ff�Kf� refers to production 
function for capital; r is interest rate; and Bf is foreign debt. If the profits measured for tax 
purposes by the home country are the same as that taxed by host country, then the dividend 
payout ratio is simply D divided by the after tax profits in the foreign country,                             
d= D
��Ff�Kf�−rBf�(1−tf)�. Therefore, the foreign tax credit is  tfD(1−tf). If td ≥ tf, the repatriation tax to 
the home country is equal to: 
tdD(1−tf) −  tfD(1−tf) =  (td− tf)(1−tf)  D ≡⊝ D            (3.4) 
The multinational company’s income in the presence of deferral system is equal to: P =  (1−td)
Fd�Kd�−rBd
+  (1−tf)
Ff�Kf�−rBf) − ⊝ D            (3.5) 
The expression implies that the optimal financial strategy for the subsidiary is to defer the 
dividend payment to the parent in order to avoid the repatriation tax. (Fuest , Huber and Mintz, 
2003).1  
3.4. International tax codes 
In this part, the relevant taxation regulations in the United States, Ireland, Singapore, Puerto Rico 
and Norway will be discussed.  
3.4.1. The U.S. corporate taxation 
U.S. corporations are taxed at up to a 35 percent statutory rate on their worldwide income. This 
high tax rate gives an incentive for the U.S. companies not to repatriate offshore funds back to the 
United States (Levin and Coburn, 2012).2  
1 Theory in this sub chapter is based on Fuest, et al (2003). 
2 Most of the information in this sub chapter is taken from Levin and Coburn. (2012) 
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Subpart F 
The U.S. statutory rate can be reduced through a mechanism such as tax provision that permits 
multinational companies to defer U.S. tax on earnings of their CFC3 until those earnings are 
brought back to the United States or repatriated as dividend (known as deferral). Deferral of tax 
on foreign income is restricted under Subpart F. It is only active income of a CFC that may be 
deferred until repatriated, but passive income earned by a CFC such as royalties, dividends and 
interest is subject to U.S. tax regardless of whether the earnings have been repatriated.  Passive 
income taxation applies when companies are sufficiently controlled by nationals or residents. The 
U.S. definition is based on 50 percent or more ownership by U.S. nationals with at least ten 
percent ownership in the foreign corporation. 
 Subpart F was designed to prevent companies from manipulating their U.S. tax obligation by 
moving intangible assets that earn this type of passive income offshore. If a foreign subsidiary is 
organised in a low-tax jurisdiction to sell to customers in higher-tax jurisdictions, the sales profits 
will be subject to tax under Subpart F. An exception exists if the foreign subsidiary manufactures 
the products itself.  
 “Active financing exception” creates loopholes in the rules by allowing multinationals to 
avoid tax of their worldwide income by creating “captive” foreign financing and insurance 
subsidiaries (United States. Citizens for Tax Justice, 2012). A captive finance company is defined 
as a subsidiary whose purpose is to provide financing to customers buying the parent’s company 
product. It is usually wholly owned by parent company.4 In addition, there is a compromise about 
the deferral that creates incentives for U.S. corporations to leave funds offshore in the low-tax 
countries and increase their after-tax profits by using the funds for indefinite investments outside 
the United States.  
Check-the-Box Regulations and the CFC Look-Through Rule 
Check-the-Box Regulations issued in 1997 and the CFC Look-Through Rule enacted in 2004 
have reduced the effectiveness of the anti-deferral rules of Subpart F and increased the offshore 
profit shifting in the last 15 years. Check-the-Box Regulations were designed to simplify tax rules 
3 CFC means any foreign corporation with more than 50 percent of: (1). The total combined voting power; (2). The 
total value of the stock of such corporation. 
4 The definition is taken from Investopedia website. Investopedia. (2015)  
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for determining whether an entity is a corporation, a partnership, a sole proprietorship, branch or 
disregard entity (DRE) for tax purpose (United States. IRS, 2015b). 
 The rules, however, had significant unintended consequences and opened the door for tax 
avoidance schemes. Under Subpart F, passive income paid from one separate legal entity to 
another separate legal entity – even if they were both in the same corporate structure – was imme-
diately taxable. The implementation of Check-the-Box Regulations enabled a U.S. multinational 
company to set up a CFC subsidiary in a tax haven and direct it to receive passive income from a 
lower-tiered related CFC without incurring Subpart F income. It happens as the rules enabled the 
multinational to choose to have the lower-tiered CFC disregard or ignored for federal tax 
purpose. It implies that although the lower tier CFC is legally a separate entity, it would be 
viewed as part of the CFC shell and not as separate entity for tax purpose.  
APB 23: Deferred Tax Liabilities on Permanently or Indefinitely Invested Foreign Earnings.  
Accounting standard APB 23 gives another incentive to shift or keep profits offshore. It permits 
U.S. multinational companies to defer recognition of tax liability on foreign earnings for financial 
reporting purpose so that earnings are not reduced by the tax liability if they affirmatively assert 
that their foreign earnings are permanently or indefinitely reinvested. APB 23 presumes that all 
undistributed earnings of a subsidiary (including all earnings of a foreign subsidiary) will be 
transferred to the parent company, will be included in its consolidated income,5 and will be 
immediately as a tax expense for financial accounting purpose.  
 The presumption of transfer to the parent may be overcome, and no income taxes shall be 
accrued “if sufficient evidence shows that subsidiary has invested or will invest the undistributed 
earnings indefinitely...”.6 This exception is referred to as “indefinite reversal”.  A multinational 
company should be able to provide evidence of specific plans for reinvestment of undistributed 
earnings of a subsidiary. This evidence includes working capital forecasts and plans for long-term 
liquidity, capital improvements, and mergers and acquisitions (PWC, 2013).  
 The multinational is required to disclose the amount of reinvested foreign earnings in their 
annual form 10-K, filled with the SEC, and in the notes to the financial statements. These 
earnings can be labelled as “deemed to be permanently reinvested” or “indefinitely reinvested”. 
5 ASC 740-30-25-3 
6 ASC 740-30-25-3 
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 By increasing the amount of foreign profits asserted as indefinitely reinvested offshore, U.S. 
multinational companies are able to increase their financial earnings by avoiding the reporting of 
increased tax liability on the financial statements, improving the earnings picture. Blouin et al 
(2011) study that permanently reinvested earnings reflect “investment and tax incentives, but 
amounts reported as PRE (permanently reinvested earnings) are also used to manage earnings”. 
Multinational companies favour the Indefinite Reversal Exception because it avails them of the 
ability consistently report higher earnings and lower effective tax rates, all else equal.  
3.4.2. Corporate tax in Singapore 
Singapore’s low tax rate, 17 percent7, and the generous tax incentive programmes have attracted 
international companies. The country is not a member of OECD, but has said that it would 
support the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Report that OECD published in July 2013 
(Armstrong, 2013). Singapore tax law only taxes income of a corporation that is derived from a 
source within Singapore or received in Singapore from outside Singapore. There is no capital 
gain tax in Singapore. Based on the regulation, tax on income would only apply for income that 
belongs to an entity located in Singapore. Hence, foreign businesses that are not operating in or 
from Singapore can bring their foreign income to Singapore without being taxed. A company 
would be deemed to be tax resident in Singapore if the “control and management” of its business 
is exercised in Singapore for the current year of assessment. Since January 1, 2003, Singapore 
has adopted the “one-tier corporate taxation system” in which corporate income will be taxed at 
the corporate level and this will be a final tax. It means that any dividends will be tax exempt in 
the hands of its shareholders. Royalties and other payments for the use or the right to use IP8 are 
subject to 10 percent withholding tax. However, this is the case if not derived by a non-resident 
through operations carried in Singapore (KPMG, 2013a). 
3.4.3. Corporate tax in Ireland 
A company resident in Ireland for tax purpose is liable to Irish corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent 
on its worldwide income, including business profits, dividends, interest, rents, royalties and capi-
tal gains (Deloitte, 2014). This is far lower than the one in the United States. If a U.S. company 
7 since 2010 
8 IP is the product or result of intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic field. It is a generic 
term for two categories: industrial property (i.e. patents, trademarks, industrial designs, and geographical indications) 
and copyright that covers literary works, films, music, artistic works and architectural design) (Switzerland. World 
Intellectual Property Organization, 2015) 
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builds a factory in Ireland that generates $10 million in profit, it pays $1.25 million in Irish tax 
instead of the $3.5 million that it would pay if it built the factory in Indiana, where then federal 
rate is 35 percent. But there are more benefits to come. Tax U.S. transfer pricing rules allow the 
Irish factory to book profits that rightly should have been taxed in the United States. Supposed 
that the Irish factory books $30 million of profits in Ireland, it pays $3.75 million in Irish tax, but 
at the same time, because it shifts $20 million of profits from the United States to Ireland. It 
reduces its U.S tax by $7 million. So the choice between locating a factory in Indiana or Ireland 
is the choice between paying $3.5 million of U.S. tax or net tax of negative $3.25 million.9 In 
effect, the U.S. Treasury is subsidizing investment in Ireland (Sullivan, 2013). Multinationals can 
further the tax benefits by shifting profits out of Ireland to zero-tax jurisdictions like Bermuda.  
3.4.4. Puerto Rico 
An international financial entity (IFE) operating in Puerto Rico under the Act by means of a 
Puerto Rico entity should not be subject to any taxes on its income from its eligible activities in 
Puerto Rico, other than the Puerto Rico income tax established in the tax decree and taxes 
imposed on dividends to the exempts business’ shareholders residing in Puerto Rico. Upon 
repatriation, the distributed income would be subject to the tax imposed by the jurisdiction in 
which the owners of the Puerto Rico entity reside, if any. The decree is a contract between 
Government of Puerto Rico and the IFE (Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Department of 
Economic Development and Commerce, n.d.). 
3.4.5. Tax regulations in Norway 
A company is regarded as resident in Norway when it is incorporated under Norwegian law and 
registered in the Norwegian Registry of Business Enterprise (i.e. Brønnøysundregistrene) or its 
central management and control is carried out in Norway. Resident companies are subject to 
corporation tax (27 percent)10 on worldwide profits and capital gains, while non-resident 
companies are subject to corporation tax on Norwegian sourced profits, including income derived 
from a permanent establishment in Norway.  
 For companies reside in Norway, all income derived from all source, as well as capital gains, 
are liable to Norwegian tax. All expenses incurred for the purpose of obtaining or securing tax-
able income are deductible. Dividend distributions are not deductible for tax purpose. Dividends 
9 $3.75 million of Irish tax minus $7 million of lower U.S. tax.  
10 from 2014 
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and capital gains distributed within EEA are tax exempt, meaning that there is no Norwegian 
withholding tax. However, for outside EEA, 15 percent withholding tax will be applied.  
 Double taxation relief is available under domestic law or in accordance with double taxation 
conventions entered into between Norway and foreign states. At present, double taxation conven-
tions with 87 nations are in effect. Since 1992, Norway has practiced the credit system, in which 
income derived from a foreign source is considered tax liable income in Norway, but the tax 
payer is credited a tax relief based on tax paid in the state of source. Credit is limited to the rate 
of Norwegian tax levied on foreign income. Relief from double taxation under domestic law is 
available either by way of a double tax credit or by deduction of the foreign tax from the 
Norwegian corporation tax base.  
 From 2007, it is possible to carry forward unused credit up to five years. This means that tax 
paid on foreign income, in a year where the domestic income is nil and the maximum foreign tax 
credit is nil, can be carries forward the following five income years within each of the income 
categories (KPMG, 2014a).11   
 Norway has adopted new regulation related to limitation of intra-group interest i.e. thin 
capitalisation (TC) rules, with effect from the financial year 2014. This regulation applies to limi-
ted liability companies, Norwegian branches of foreign companies and partnerships. It limits the 
intra-group deduction to an amount equal to 30 percent of tax-adjusted earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA).  
 The rules apply to interest expenses from related parties (directly or indirectly hold 50 
percent or more of the shares) and to loans guaranteed by related parties. However, payments to 
third parties also count towards the maximum deductible interest. The rules do not apply to 
companies with NOK 5 million or less in net interest costs (including interest on related-party 
and third party debt). The basis for the calculation is the taxable income including adjustment for 
group contribution. Group contributions are deductible for the contributor and taxable income for 
the recipient. Tax-exempt income such as dividends and gains on shares does not increase the 
basis for deduction. Only deductions for interest payments to related parties can be disallowed 
under the proposed rules. Disallowed related-party interest costs can be carried forward for up to 
ten years (KPMG International, 2014). 
11 Most of the information in this subchapter is taken from KPMG. (2014a)  
 
 
 
                                                          
21 
  
3.5. Tax Havens and other secrecy jurisdictions 
3.5.1. Tax havens 
Gravelle (2010) points out that tax haven is not a define term, but in most usage it refers to a 
country – in many cases small ones – where non-residents can save taxes by conducting various 
investments, transactions, and activities. Attributes that make a country a tax haven include low 
or non-existent tax rules applicable to foreigners; strict bank and financial secrecy laws; and a 
highly developed communications, financial and legal structure. Many tax haven countries are 
small island nations, such as Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands. 
 Central feature of a tax haven is its laws and other measures that can be used to evade or 
avoid the tax laws or regulations of other jurisdictions. Minimisation of tax liability is an 
important element. This generally depends on (a) the use of paper or “shell” companies, trusts 
and other legal entities, and (b) routing and managing financial flows (Gravelle, 2010). 
 The OECD 1998 report defines a tax haven as a jurisdiction which has: (a) no or only nomi-
nal taxes and offers itself as a place to be used by non-residents to escape tax in their country of 
residence; (b) laws or administrative practices which prevent the effective exchange of relevant 
information with other governments on tax payer benefiting from the low or no tax jurisdiction; 
(c) lack of transparency; (d) the absence of requirement that the activity be substantial, since it 
would suggest that a jurisdiction may be attempting to attract investment or transactions that are 
purely tax driven.  
 Due to the imprecise definition of tax haven, there have been differences in the categorisa-
tion. OECD, the IMF, U.U. Senate and the Tax Justice Network (TJN) have their own definition 
of tax haven and it results in different designation of tax haven. The reason is the desire of many 
states to prevent their designation as a tax haven, for example, OECD's 2000 tax haven list does 
not include any of its member. 12 Some countries meet only one or few of the criteria as tax 
haven, for example the Netherlands (NOU (2009:19). Van Dijk, Weyzig and Murphy (2006) 
point out that the Netherlands exchanges information both through an extensive network of tax 
treaties and through EU's savings directive. However, it can be regarded as a tax haven because it 
has regulations which allow companies to reduce their tax in other countries by establishing shell 
companies there.  
12 Appendix 1 shows the designation of tax haven by various institution. 
 
 
                                                          
22 
  
 Tax haven causes distortion in economy as the discrepancy between real economic activity 
and what is only apparent is at the heart of the tax haven issue. Much of the economic activity 
that appears to be in tax havens actually occurs in another place. Thus, for example, much of the 
income reported by U.S.-controlled subsidiaries chartered in tax havens may have their true 
economic location either in some other foreign countries or in the United States (Gravelle, 2010).  
 Further, Gravelle (2010) mentions that U.S. firms can also use tax havens to shift income out 
of foreign countries where there are corporate income taxes to the zero-tax environment many tax 
havens offer. These techniques for shifting income include manipulation of transfer prices and 
the structuring of intra-firm lending and interest charges so as to shift income out of high-tax 
countries to tax havens (sometimes called “earnings stripping”) 
 The ability of firms to divert income from foreign locations to tax havens has implication for 
the real location of investment. Regarding the allocation of investment, the United States is a 
relatively “high tax” country. Thus, much of the income shifted to tax havens is likely shifted 
from countries whose taxes are lower than U.S. taxes. As a result, it is likely that tax havens on 
balance magnify the distorting effects of deferral, thus, further diverting U.S. investment to 
foreign location and in turn, reducing economic efficiency and U.S. national welfare. In addition, 
tax havens reduce tax revenue collections by capital-exporting countries. In the case of U.S. 
firms’ use of tax havens, the revenue loss can accrue both to the United States (in the case of 
income shifted from domestic sources) and other countries (in the case of income shifted from 
other countries with higher taxes). Tax havens flourish in part because of the lack of coordination 
in tax administration between non-haven, and that effort to suppress tax haven activities cannot 
be successful without solidarity among non-haven countries (Gravelle, 2010).  
3.5.2. Secrecy jurisdictions 
The term of secrecy jurisdiction is also used to describe places called tax havens, offshore finan-
cial centres or international financial centres. However, the description of secrecy jurisdictions is 
in three parts. Firstly, they are places that intentionally create regulation for the benefit and use of 
non-residents in their geographical domain. Secondly, they intentionally design the regulation for 
use by non-residents in their territories so that it undermines the legislation or regulation of ano-
ther jurisdiction. Thirdly, they create a deliberate, legally backed veil of secrecy to ensure that 
those from outside the jurisdiction making use of its regulation cannot be identified to be doing 
so.  
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 The definition implies that secrecy jurisdictions knowingly assist people from outside their 
domains break the law in the places where they live and make it as hard as possible to be 
discovered. It means that those secrecy jurisdictions are complicit in the law breaking process.  
 Secrecy jurisdictions provide all facilitate of illicit financial flows, including those related to 
crime, piracy, counterfeiting, corruption, tax evasion and much more. These activities undermine 
the rule of law and threaten the stability of the world. Secrecy jurisdictions also undermine free 
trade by assisting illicit trade and creating opacity in which prevent the best location for 
production to be found so that world income is reduced. By seeking to force down the tax rate 
levied by democratically elected government, they undermine democracy. Secrecy jurisdictions 
create opacity and mistrust (United Kingdom. Tax Research, 2010).13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 This sub chapter is based on UK. Tax Research. (2010) 
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4. TAX MINIMISATION STRATEGIES 
As Gresik (2001) points out, a multinational corporation has several ways to structure its activi-
ties in order to minimise the taxation burden. This tax planning involves conventional decision to 
set up firms in a tax-efficient way, for example by using debt rather than equity or by exploiting 
the specific characteristics of multinationals. In this chapter these tax minimisation strategies will 
be discussed. 
4.1. Transfer pricing 
4.1.1. Definition 
Tang (1993) defines transfer price as the price charged in transactions between related firms, for 
example between a parent company and its foreign subsidiary or between two affiliates. Transfer 
pricing is the system of laws and practices used by countries to ensure that goods and services 
transferred between related companies are appropriately priced, based on market conditions, such 
as profits are correctly reflected in each jurisdiction (U.S. Joint Committee of Taxation, 2010). 
Multinational companies normally set their transfer price based on either production costs or 
market prices. Principles regarding transfer pricing are largely build upon the principle of arm’s 
length nature of transfers between related parties.  
4.1.2. The use of transfer price 
Eden (1998) mentions that there are both internal and external motivations for the multinational 
companies to establish transfer prices for intra-firm trade. Many foreign affiliates are run as profit 
centres where the rewards of the top management team depend on their affiliate’s profits. The 
setting of the transfer price in this case is internally driven, as a way to both motivate managers 
and monitor subsidiary performance. Externally, multinational companies have to pay corporate 
income taxes on their domestic and foreign source income, necessitating that they set transfer 
price for intra-firm import of goods. Transfer price manipulation is the over-/under-invoicing of 
related party transactions in order to avoid government regulation or to exploit cross-border 
differences in tax rates. Desai et al (2004) point out that it is entirely possible for firms to adjust 
transfer prices in a tax-sensitive fashion without violating any laws. 
 There are several ways to transfer assets or services between a parent company and an 
offshore affiliate entity: an outright sale of the assets; a licensing agreement where the economic 
rights transferred to an affiliate in exchange for a licensing fee or royalty stream; sale of services 
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or a cost sharing agreement; and an agreement between related entities to share the cost of 
developing an intangible asset, which typically includes a “buy-in” payment. A “buy-in” payment 
is an initial contribution for the development already and undertaken and future payment for the 
continued development of the intangible assets. Hilten et al (2010) mention that the amount of the 
“buy-in” payment should be based on arm’s length value. The "buy-in" payment should be equal 
to the estimated market value of the pre-buy-in intangibles (calculated as of the date the cost 
sharing agreement becomes effective). Income-based methods are the most likely to be used in 
the valuation due to the available data of expected cash flow. However, valuation intangible 
assets are not easy as often there are no comparable assets in the market.14  
 The tax advantage associated with cost sharing is that (estimated) market prices are replaced 
by incurred costs. Suppose a company consists a parent and its subsidiary. The parent develops a 
patent for an intangible asset that can be sold by the parent and the subsidiary. When they enter  
cost sharing agreement, the subsidiary must pay the parent a fraction of the cost of developing the 
patent. This fraction is determined by the patent's relative benefit to the parent and the subsidiary. 
If there is no such agreement, the subsidiary has to make a royalty payment for each unit that the 
subsidiary sells. The royalty is equal to the estimated market value of the licence to sell the 
patented product. Both the subsidiary's royalty payment and cost sharing payment to the parent 
create taxable income to the parent and are tax deductible for the subsidiary. Therefore, if the 
parent operates in a higher tax jurisdiction than does the subsidiary, the firm can reduce its 
worldwide tax liability by using a cost sharing agreement. The existence of "buy-in" payment 
which is taxable income to the parent and is tax deductible to the sub does not reduce the 
attractiveness of cost sharing agreement. It is because the "buy-in" payment reduces the subsi-
diary's post-buy-in payments to the parent (Dye, 2008). 
 Income shifting can occur when a multinational company sells or licenses the foreign rights 
of intangible assets developed in the parent company to its subsidiary in a low-tax country (a 
subsidiary which in many cases was created for income shifting purpose). Once the foreign 
subsidiary owns the right, the profits derived from the technology become those of the subsidiary, 
not the parent (under the U.S. tax rules, the subsidiary must pay “arm’s length” prices for the 
rights, which means the subsidiary would have to pay the same amount for the assets that an 
unrelated third party would pay for the right). 
14 Also mention in 5/16/2012, JP Morgan, “Global Tax Rate Makers” 
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 The licence payment made by the subsidiary to its parent is taxable income, but the parent 
has an incentive to set the price as low as possible. If the price paid is low compared to future 
profits generated by the license rights, less income is taxable to the parent and the subsidiary’s 
expenses are lower. Thus, the U.S. parent has successfully shifted taxable profits out of the 
United States to the low-tax subsidiary.  
 This method is formalised in the model pointed out by Schjelderup (2013). Imagine a multi-
national company with affiliates in country A and B. Both are monopolists and there is neither 
taxation nor other customs duties regarding import activities. In the situation where there is no 
regulation about the transfer price, the multinational objective is to maximise the global profits 
through the determination of the price. 
 Firm A produces goods 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴and 𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵. 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 is sold in country A at the price of 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴)giving 
revenue equal to 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴) = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴)𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴. Firm B imports goods B and sells them in country B at 
price 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵(𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵) so that revenue is given as 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵(𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵)𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵. Firm B has only a sales function so that the 
costs related to production of the goods is given by 𝐶𝐶(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴+𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵). The price that firm A charges for 
the goods B is an intern price, p. With the assumption that the profit function is concave, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
 > 0 
and 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕2𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
 ≤ 0, and the cost function is convex, 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕
2𝐶𝐶
𝜕𝜕2𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
 > 0, the profit function for the two 
affiliates is: 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴= 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴) - 𝐶𝐶(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴+𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵) + 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 (4.1) 
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵= 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵) - 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵    (4.2) 
Maximised joint profit of the two firms is  {𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 + 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 } = {𝑅𝑅(𝑄𝑄) −  𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴(𝑄𝑄) −  𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵(𝑄𝑄)𝑄𝑄𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 },        
leads to the first order condition, 𝑅𝑅′(𝑄𝑄) = 𝐶𝐶 ′𝐴𝐴(𝑄𝑄) +  𝐶𝐶 ′𝐵𝐵(𝑄𝑄) (4.3) 
In the centralised decision-making, transfer price has no real economic meaning as all that 
matters are the revenue and cost function, so that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Transfer 
price is only an instrument to allocate profits between firm A and B after total profits have been 
maximised.  
 
 
27 
  
Further assumption is that firm A faces tax rate, 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴, in country A and firm B faces tax rate, 𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵, in 
country B. After-tax function for each firm: 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴= (1 −  𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴) [𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴) - 𝐶𝐶(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴+𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵) + 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵] (4.4) 
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵= (1 −  𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵) [𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵) - 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵] (4.5) 
The after-tax global profits: 
𝜋𝜋 =  (1 −  𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴) [𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴) - 𝐶𝐶(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴+𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵) + 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵] + (1 −  𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵) [𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵(𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵) - 𝑝𝑝𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵]   (4.6) 
After-tax profit maximising function with respect to transfer pricing is given by the first order 
condition:  
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
= (1 − 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)[𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵] + (1 −  𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵)[−𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵]       
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
= (𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 − 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)[𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵] (4.7) 
In the situation where the corporate tax rates in both countries are equal (i.e. 𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴), 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 = 0, the 
optimal transfer price, p*, will be zero. If the corporate tax rate in country B is higher than in 
country A (i.e. 𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 > 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴), 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 > 0, this will give an incentive to set the transfer price from firm A to 
firm B higher in order to shift profits from firm B (high-tax country) to firm A (low-tax country). 
The optimal transfer price will be as high as possible until 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 0, so that p* = 
𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵(𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵)
𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵
. 
 In the case where each firm is a separate unit with powers of deciding on how much to pro-
duce and to which price, firm A will maximise its profits by choosing Q taking p as given, and 
firm B will maximise its own profits by setting p, taking into account the demand from division. 
This method, however, leads to double marginalisation problem where firm B behaves as a 
monopolist against firm A. The total result is lower profits overall compared to centralised 
decision-making. 
 To avoid the double marginalisation problem, a simple model Cournot competition is used. 
Under delegation the headquarter of the multinational, firm sets p but allows firms A and B to set 
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 and  𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵. This can be done by two stages: (i) the headquarter sets p to maximise global profit 
(i.e. 𝜋𝜋 =  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 + 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵); (ii) both firm A and B observe p and taking p as given – choose their optimal 
level of sales. 
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The global profits from centralised-maximised after-tax profit:  
𝜋𝜋 = (1 −  𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴) [𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴) - 𝐶𝐶(𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴+𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵) + 𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵(𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵)𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵  • 𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵] (4.8) 
Optimal level of quantity for each firm is found by deriving the function above with regard to 
quantity in each firm: 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴
= (1 −  𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴) �𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 −  𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴� = 0     𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 = (1 −  𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)[𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 −  𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶] = 0   (4.9) 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵
= (1 −  𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴) �𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 −  𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑩𝑩� = 0     𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 = (1 −  𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴)[𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 −  𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶] = 0   (4.10) 
Both firms decide the quantity so that the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost in each 
firm  (𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖). This is a maximisation strategy for a monopolist. However, due to the absen-
ce of regulations about transfer pricing, the multinational can set up the transfer pricing so that all 
profits in the high-tax country can be shifted to the low-tax country. If 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 >  𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵, the transfer price 
from firm A to firm B will be set as low as possible in order to keep the profits in firm B. In the 
case that there is a transfer price restriction, the lowest transfer price a firm can use is the 
marginal cost and the highest is the market price. 
4.1.3. Other transfer pricing manipulation methods. 
Apart from transaction between two entities within the same group located in different tax juris-
dictions, income shifting trough transfer pricing can also be done by using shell company 
(located in a tax haven). The goods are sold to the shell company with a low price and then from 
there at higher price. This method will ensure an income transfer to the shell company from the 
rest of the group (NOU, 2009:19, p.67). 
4.2. Thin capitalisation 
Thin capitalisation refers to the situation in which a company is financed by means of debt 
instead of equity capital that is motivated by the structure of the income tax laws (Columbia Law 
Review, 1995). Thinly capitalised companies are sometimes referred to as ”highly leveraged” or 
“highly geared” (OECD, 2012). The motive behind thin capitalisation is country tax rules that 
typically allow a deduction for interest paid or payable (i.e. debt tax shield)15 at the tax measure 
15 Debt tax shield is defined as tax rate multiply by the amount payable interest  
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of profit. Therefore, the higher the level of debt in a company, the higher the amount of interest it 
pays (also the higher the debt tax shield) and the lower the taxable profit.  
  The manner in which a company is capitalised can have significant effect in the amount 
of profits it reports and the amount of tax it pays. Both domestic and multinational companies use 
the debt tax shield as a key driver in their capital structure. However, multinational companies are 
able to exploit the tax advantage of debt more aggressively than domestic companies by shifting 
debt from affiliates in low-tax countries to affiliates in high-tax countries (Møen et al, 2011). The 
exact effect on tax revenue of increased interest payments (i.e. debt tax shield) depends on 
withholding tax and the provision of any tax treaties in force.  
4.3. Debt tax shield 
Møen et al (2011) show that for multinational companies, it is optimal to use both internal and 
external debt to save taxes, and there are three debt tax shield effects that can be used; the 
standard debt tax shield effect and two effects related to international debt shifting: internal debt 
shifting and external debt shifting. The use of both internal and external debt is motivated by 
differences in national statutory tax rate in the countries where affiliates are located. The value of 
internal debt tax shield is maximised if internal lending is performed by a financial centre located 
in the country with the lowest effective tax rate. For external debt, the tax shield is maximised 
when multinational companies balance external debt across affiliates, taking into account the tax 
rate in all the countries where the group is present. It is profitable to use more debt in the 
affiliates located in a country where there is an increase in the tax rate. Since more debt will 
increase bankruptcy costs, it is necessary to reduce the use of debt in all other affiliates to keep 
the bankruptcy costs in check.  
4.3.1. Standard debt tax shield 
The standard debt tax shield is generated from the interest payment tax deductibility i.e. 𝛽𝛽1•𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖, 
where β1 = 
𝑟𝑟
µ+ 𝛾𝛾 (with r is the cost of capital, and µ and γ are positive constant); and 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖is the 
corporate tax rate in the country i. The higher the corporate tax rate in country i, the larger the 
external debt tax shield. In this case both domestic and multinational companies can benefit from 
the tax saving. 
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4.3.2. External debt shifting mechanism 
The external debt shifting mechanism is given by the term 𝛽𝛽2•∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 �𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� , where 𝛽𝛽2 = 
𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟(µ+ 𝛾𝛾)µ ; 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗∑𝑗𝑗𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗, denotes the share of real capital employed in affiliate j in total real capital in 
the multinational company; and �𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗� is the weighted tax difference between country i and 
other countries. For a given level of bankruptcy costs, 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓, it is optimal to allocate external debt in 
the affiliates that have the largest tax differentials in order to produce the highest absolute tax 
savings. A tax rate increase in one affiliate leads to an international shifting of external debt, 
increasing the debt-to-asset ratio in the affiliate experiencing the tax increase, but decreasing the 
debt-to-asset ratio in all other affiliates in order to keep the bankruptcy costs in check. It is crucial 
that the parent company guarantees for debt at the affiliate level. If it does not, then it is not 
optimal to shift external debt. 
4.3.3. Internal debt shifting mechanism 
The internal debt shifting mechanism is given by the term 𝛽𝛽3•(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡1), where 𝛽𝛽3 = 𝑟𝑟ƞ (with r is 
the cost of capital, and ƞ is positive constant) and (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡1) is maximum tax difference between 
effective tax rate in affiliate i and affiliate 1 (i.e. internal bank). It is profit maximising for a 
multinational company to use internal debt that can be provided by any affiliates. However, a tax 
efficient financing structure implies that it is the affiliate located in the country with the lowest 
effective tax rate that will be the financial coordination centre (i.e. internal bank) as the variable (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡1) is the net tax advantage (i.e. maximum tax difference).  
4.4. Chains of ownership  
There are two methods of using chains of ownership to avoid home country taxes (Desai, Foley 
and Hines, 2002). Altshuler and Grubert (2002) outline the two strategies. First strategy shows 
that foreign earnings, instead of being repatriated, are used to purchase equity in other existing 
foreign affiliates. This is called "triangular strategy" because ownership of the indirectly held 
affiliate is split between the parent and one of its affiliates. The triangular strategy replaces or 
adds to the original equity from the parent in the indirectly help affiliate with earnings from 
operations of another foreign affiliate. As long as affiliates own at least ten percent16  of the other 
16 Ten percent ownership makes the investment "active" from the U.S. tax system stand point. 
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foreign operations in which they invest, they can continue to defer U.S. taxation of their foreign 
income (in Desai et al, 2002, p.11). 
 The second indirect ownership strategy is when a multinational company uses retained 
earnings from foreign operations to capitalise its initial investments in new foreign affiliates. The 
parent company then has no direct ownership in the new foreign affiliate, instead owning it 
indirectly through one or more tiers of other foreign affiliates. The multiple-tiers strategy 
provides reallocation of earnings that would otherwise face repatriation taxes.  
 
 
 
 A: Triangular strategy       B: A multiple-tiers strategy  
Figure 4.1.Use of chains of ownership to mitigate repatriation taxes.17 
4.5. Other tax minimisation strategies. 
4.5.1. Double Irish arrangement and Dutch sandwich 
The double Irish exploits the different definitions of corporate residency in Ireland and the United 
States. Ireland taxes companies if they are controlled and managed in Ireland, while the U.S.’ tax 
definition of tax residency is based on where a corporation is registered (Houlder, 2014). 
 Houlder (2014) explains further that exploiting the double Irish involves forming a pair of 
Irish companies to turn payments on IP into tax-deductible royalty payments. The U.S. parent 
company forms two Irish subsidiaries: IP-Holding and Operating Company. The IP-Holding is 
the first-tier Irish subsidiary. The U.S. parent company signs a contract giving European rights of 
its IPs to the IP-Holding. In return, the Irish subsidiary agrees to market the products in Europe or 
other jurisdictions outside the United States. Thus, all the non U.S. jurisdiction income - that 
previously would have been taxed in the United States - is taxed in Ireland instead. Then, the 
Irish subsidiary changes its headquarters to tax haven (e.g. Bermuda) as it is managed and 
17 In the triangular strategy, the retained earnings of affiliate 1 are invested in the pre-existing affiliate 2, replacing 
the parent company's equity capitalisation of affiliate 2. Thus, the retained earnings of affiliate 1 are redeployed 
within the parent system without triggering repatriation taxes. In the multiple tiers strategy, the earnings of affiliate 1 
are invested as the equity capitalisation of a new affiliate 2, effecting a redeployment of earnings within the parent 
system without triggering repatriation taxes. 
Parent Affiliate 1 
Affiliate 2 
Parent 
Affiliate 2 
Affiliate 1 
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controlled in Bermuda. While U.S. rules determine tax residency of a corporation based on its 
place of incorporation, Irish rules often determines tax residency based on the country where the 
company is managed and controlled. The result is that Ireland considers the company to be tax-
resident in Bermuda, while the United States considers it to be tax-resident in Ireland. Hence, 
neither the United States nor Ireland will levy any tax to this IP-Holding. 
 The IP-Holding can licence the IP rights for royalty or licence fees to the Operating 
Company which is treated as disregarded under U.S. tax law - by filing a one-page form, so that 
the transaction will not trigger any tax payment for passive income. The Operating Company 
receives income from the use of assets outside the United States, but the taxable profits are low 
because the high royalty or licence fees paid to the IP-Holding; and these fees are tax-deductible 
expenses. Therefore, the effective tax rate is – perfectly legally – far below Ireland’s low rate 
12.5 percent. Royalty payments received by IP-Holding are neither taxed by Ireland nor the 
United States until the money is eventually sent to the U.S. parent company. 
 It is even more alluring if it is used in combination with the “Dutch Sandwich”, in which the 
transfer between the two Irish firms is then routed via another subsidiary (i,e. shell company) in 
the Netherlands to further reduce the amount for tax paid. It happens as U.S. parent company, in 
addition to the two Irish subsidiaries, creates one Conduit Company incorporated in the 
Netherlands. This Conduit Company is also owned by the IP-Holding and sublicenses the IP. In 
this way the IP-Holding is the single owner of the Operating Company and the Conduit Com-
pany. The royalty payments are then transferred to the Conduit Company instead of directly to 
the IP-Holding, avoiding Irish withholding tax on royalty payments from Operating Company to 
IP-Holding in Bermuda. By using Double Irish Dutch sandwich, withholding taxes can be 
completely avoided as royalties paid from Ireland to the Netherlands are tax-free under EU 
Interest and Royalty Directive, and the Netherlands do not impose withholding tax on any royalty 
payments regardless the residence state of the receiving company. The tax liability of the Conduit 
Company is only a small fee payable for the use of the Dutch tax system (Fuest et al, 2013). 
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Figure 4.2. Double Irish and Dutch sandwich. 
4.5.2. Holding company 
Multinational companies may decide to establish a holding company for a range of reasons such 
as to manage a group of subsidiaries in a particular region by centralising financing, licensing, 
and management activities. A holding company also provides tax efficiencies in relation to 
withholding taxes on dividends and taxes on capital gains. Tax is a relevant factor in choosing the 
appropriate location for a holding company (Deloitte, 2015). 
4.5.3. Trust 
A trust is "a collection of assets where the formal and legal owner of the assets (the trustees or 
managers) have agreed to undertake to manage the assets for the benefit of those who, according 
to the basis for establishment (the foundation agreement or the trust agreement/trust deed) are 
designated as beneficiaries of the trust" (NOU, 2009:19, p.39). This definition implies that as 
legal instruments, trusts distinguish between formal ownership (legal ownership), which is held 
by managers ("trustees") and those who are entitled to benefits from its assets ("beneficial owner-
ship"). The beneficiaries can be the founders of the trust, the settlors, or individuals that the 
settlors want to favour. The settlors or subsequent transfer may fund the trust when it is establis-
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hed, but after the establishment, the fund of the trust can be transferred or provided by others 
(NOU, 2009:19, p.40). 
 Trusts enable the trustees, as the owner of the trust funds, to avoid taxes on the funds as the 
funds are not part of their personal wealth. Also, if the trustees go bankrupt, the creditors cannot 
target the funds. The trust funds do not form part of the wealth of the beneficiaries before the 
beneficiaries formally receive the contributions mentioned in the trust agreement. The 
beneficiaries will be liable for taxes only for funds that they receive. This situation means that 
during the period after the establishment and the valid transfer of the funds to the trust and before 
the funds are distributed to the beneficiaries, the trust funds have independent rights and 
obligations (NOU, 2009:19, p.40).  
 Despite all the fact, a trust is not an independent legal object. The ownership held by trustees 
is the same to an owner, but limited by the contents of the trust agreements. Trustees as the 
formal owner of the trust funds do not further their own interest, but act in the interest of the 
beneficiaries. If the trustees file a law suit, the beneficiaries bear the risk of the suit. The 
beneficiaries also bear all commercial and market risks for changes in the value of the trust as a 
consequence of the decision made by the trustees. The trust structure is unfamiliar and difficult to 
understand compared to Norwegian legal entities, especially the relationship between legal and 
beneficial ownership (NOU, 2009:19, p.40-41). 
 Trusts present opportunities to be abused for illegal purposes. The important thing here is 
keeping the existence of the trust secret, more over the one who is behind and controls the trust's 
funds. The purpose is to conceal who has the right to dispose the funds. Outsider should receive 
an impression that beneficiaries do not have the power to dispose the trust funds in order to claim 
that the trust funds are not owned and controlled by the beneficiaries, even though the truth is 
other way around. Therefore, tax havens are an important part of trusts as they are open to the 
establishment of trusts that allow to conceal structures due to their rules of secrecy. Without 
public registration of trust and trust beneficiaries, tax authorities and third parties will find 
difficulties in obtaining information about the assets located in trusts. Normally, a trust in tax 
haven does not own assets directly in the countries that are not tax havens. The trust will often 
become a top tier in a corporate chain of "exempted companies". Subordinate in tax havens, 
however, may own companies in countries that are not tax havens (NOU, 2009:19, p.42). At the 
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end of June 2007, there were 245 banks and trust companies licensed to do business in The 
Bahamas (The Central Bank of The Bahamas, 2015). 
 Since trusts are not registered publicly anywhere, the position of the trustee may be moved 
between various jurisdictions without formalities. However, the assets of the trust are not moved 
and they are located in subordinate companies across the world. Local agents fulfil the function 
of trustee. Concealed structures in tax havens often work with concealing mechanism in other 
states. The purpose is to operate through tax haven-based structure without being obvious to the 
outside world. Links to companies in the tax haven can be masked by using virtual addresses and 
mail drop-services. A related conduit company can also be established in a "respectable" country 
and used to conceal the underlying structure in tax havens (NOU, 2009:19, p.46).  
4.5.4. Shell company 
Garner (1999) defines a shell company as an entity that does not have active business and usually 
exists only in name as a vehicle for another company’s business operation (in Kinner and Vona, 
n.d.). It is a corporation that exists mainly on paper, has no physical presence, no employees and 
produces nothing. In addition there are red flags to identify this type of company: no phone 
number, e-mail address, physical address, company logo, contact person and federal identifi-
cation number. Shell companies are also referred as international business companies (IBC) 
(Transparency International, 2015). 
 Shell companies are very easy to form. The principal owner of the business, an attorney or 
an individual acting as a third-party may submit the filings for the company formation by mail, 
fax, e-mail or in person. The state makes decision to accept, suspect or reject the formation. The 
whole process takes time from five minutes to 60 days. It is usually formed in a tax haven or 
secrecy jurisdiction and its main purpose is to insulate the real beneficiary (beneficial owner) 
from taxes, disclosure or both (i.e. to take advantage of tax benefits). Delaware, Wyoming, and 
Nevada are the top three states for shell company formations, with Delaware being number one 
(Kinner and Vona, n.d.). Companies can run their international business through this shell corpo-
ration and they will not have to report the profits to their domestic government. By doing this, it 
looks like they are not making any significant money in their domestic market and the shell 
corporation is making all the money. Since the shell corporation is set up in the tax haven, they 
will pay very low taxes (Financial web, 2015). 
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 The Netherlands is attractive as the location of shell companies due to Dutch tax regulations 
and an extensive network of tax treaties. These shell companies formally have an address and 
management in the country. However, the management can often be regarded as front person as 
the real leadership is located in another country (NOU, 2009:19). 
 There are several forms of a shell corporation: a corporation, a limited liability company 
(LLC), a partnership, or a sole proprietorship. Corporation and LLCs offer limited liability to 
owners of the company so that the owner’s personal assets are not held accountable in lawsuits if 
any are brought against the company. However, LLC has its hybrid features namely limited 
liabilities to owners and the avoidance of double taxation (Kinner and Vona, n.d).  
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5. ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Multinational companies have the possibility to avoid tax or even evade tax by using simple 
methods or complex and advanced ones. This chapter will present the literature review on 
aggressive tax planning to know the methods used and the result from the previous analyses.  
5.1. Transfer pricing. 
Transfer pricing can be analysed using direct and indirect methods.  
5.1.1. Direct analysis 
According to OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Adminis-
tration, traditional transaction methods are considered as the most direct means to establish 
whether the conditions in the commercial and financial relations between associated enterprises 
are at arm’s length. The reason is that any differences in the price used in the transactions within 
a multinational company from the price in the comparable outside (uncontrolled) price indicate 
the deviation of transfer price from the arm’s length principle.  
 In the real life, however, this is very difficult to find and to prove. Multinational companies 
try to hide or not to disclose their transfer pricing, especially when it deviates from the arm’s 
length principle. Another important reason is when there is no comparable product in the 
uncontrolled (external) market, so that comparison becoming impossible.  
 Both theoretical and empirical evidences suggest that multinational companies with affiliates 
in different tax jurisdictions have the incentive to shift taxable income from high-tax jurisdiction 
to low-tax jurisdiction through the use of transfer prices (Tran, 2014). Using monthly data on 
U.S. international trade price between 1997-1999, Clausing (2003) finds that there is a relation-
ship between countries’ tax rates and the prices of intra-firm transactions, in which lower tax rate 
in a country will lower U.S. intra-firm export price and increase U.S. intra-firm import price. The 
result indicates that a tax rate one percent lower in a country destination/origin is associated with 
intra-firm export price that are 1.8 percent lower and intra-firm import price that are 2.0 percent 
higher. This finding is consistent with theoretical predictions regarding tax-motivated income 
shifting behaviour. 
 Swenson (2001) studies the prices of U.S. imports and tax changes in the United States and 
abroad from 1981-1988 and finds that five percent decline in foreign tax rates causes 0.024 
percent increase in import price of the affiliates. 
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5.1.2. Indirect analysis 
Research on transfer pricing and income shifting typically relies on publicly available data. This 
data limitation leads to the focus on indirect evidence of income shifting. Many papers use proxy 
such as reported income, tax payments and intra-firm exports (Swenson, 2001).  Alternatively, 
the level of profits in the various group companies can indicate whether prices between them are 
unreasonable, i.e. manipulated transfer pricing (NOU, 2009:19, p.67). 
 Cross sectional analysis done by Grubert and Mutti (1991) indicates that the observed 
pattern of reported profits in high- and low-tax countries is consistent with income shifting 
behaviour. The analysis is done using 1982 data on a cross-section of 33 countries. The result 
shows that total imports are greater from location in which U.S. multinational companies face 
low-tax rate. In addition, lower taxes lead to disproportionately large increases in trade with 
affiliates, due to the tax benefits of intra-company trade. 
 Gordon and Hines (2002) acknowledge that economic studies examining tax motivated intra-
firm trading provide only indirect evidence that transfer prices are a tool for tax minimisation. 
Jacob (1996) provides indirect archival evidence of a negative association between intra-firm 
trade volume and tax costs for multinationals, consistent with transfer price and being used as a 
mechanism for tax reduction. Dischinger (2007) shows that if the difference in the statutory 
corporate tax rate of an affiliate and its parent increases by ten percentage points, the unconsoli-
dated pre-tax profits in the affiliate company will decrease by approximately seven percent. 
Wheeler (1988) describes U.S. tax courts cases where income was apparently shifted for tax 
reason. 
 In Norway, Balsvik et al (2009) show that profits are being shifted from high- tax countries 
into Norway, and out of Norway to lower tax countries. Using data from three different databa-
ses, namely Brønnøysundregistrene (The Register of Business enterprises), SIFON-registeret and 
Skattedirektoratet from 1992-2005, they find empirical result of aggressive use of transfer pricing 
by multinational companies that results in total loss of tax revenue as high as 30 percent of total 
possible tax income from these multinational companies. Earlier, Langli and Saudagaran (2004) 
also report that more than 50 percent foreign-owned companies within manufacturing and trading 
have profit margin which is 2.6 percent lower compared to Norwegian-owned companies during 
year 1993-1996. 
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 Using panel data technique, Møen and Tropina (2009) find out that average profit margin for 
multinational companies is 5.2 percentage points lower than Norwegian domestic companies (5.3 
percentage points compared to 10.5 percentage points). After controlling factors such as age, size 
and leverage level, industry, share of capital and fiscal year, profit margin of foreign-owned 
multinational companies is 3.6 percentage points lower than Norwegian domestic companies. 
Controlling for unobserved company-specific fixed effect, the estimate difference increases to 
4.5. They find that profit margin of Norwegian-owned multinational companies is 0.9 percentage 
points lower than Norwegian domestic companies. Again, controlling for unobserved company-
specific fixed effect, the estimate difference increases to 2.5. Using assumption that the estimated 
difference of profit margin is due to manipulation of intern price, the lost of tax revenue might be 
as high as 40 percent of possible tax income or around NOK 7.5 billions. 
5.2. Optimisation of capital structure 
Taxes are thought to influence corporate decisions in many ways. The reason is its ability to 
deduct interest payments from taxable income due the tax-favoured status of debt (Graham, 
2011). The possibility to use debt can further benefit multinational companies due to lower 
effective capital costs compared to the domestic companies.  
5.2.1. Analysis of total debt 
Huizinga et al (2008) shows in their empirical analysis that tax changes lead to debt rebalancing. 
Using data from 32 European countries from years 1994-2003, the result shows that for a 
multinational with equal size of affiliates in two countries, a 10 percent tax increase in one 
country will increase the debt-to-asset ratio in that country by 2.4 percent. On the other hand, the 
debt-to-asset ratio in the other country will decrease by 0.6 percent.  
 Under firm-specific benefit functions, Graham (2000) calculates the value of the capitalised 
tax benefits of debt finance for the U.S. case is equal to 9.7 percent of firm value. The typical 
firm could double tax benefits by issuing debt until the marginal tax benefit begins to decline. 
 Alworth (1988, chapter 5) and Keen (1991) show that whenever there is tax difference 
between home and host country, there is a tax advantage for multinational companies to shift 
profits from the higher tax country to the lower tax country by debt shifting (or interest 
payments). Jog and Tang (2001) confirm that following the U.S and Canadian tax reform 
(Canada became a country with relatively high-tax rates), significant changes occurred in debt 
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levels of multinational companies in Canada. Their aggregate result shows a reduction in taxes 
from foreign controlled corporations (FCCs) in Canada as a proportion of total corporate 
revenues. This reduction is consistent with the increase in debt-to-asset ratio. Since U.S.-
controlled corporations (USCCs) control a significant fraction of Canadian corporate assets and 
operating income, the evident debt-shifting policies adopted by USCCs benefited the United 
States at the expenses of Canadian tax revenues. In aggregate, there was around $3.5 billion loss 
on Canadian tax revenues due to the debt shifting. 
 Hines and Hubbard (1990), Collins and Shackelford (1992), Froot and Hines (1992), Grubert 
(1998) and Altshuler and Grubert (2003) provide evidence that U.S. multinational financial 
structure and the pattern of intra-firm interest and other income flows are consistent with tax 
minimization objectives. Using German data, Ramb and Weichenrieder (2004) find that the 
financial structure of foreign affiliates in Germany are partly tax motivated, i.e. the leverage 
decision is affected by the size of German tax rate.  
5.2.2. Analysis of internal and external debt 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) examine the use of debt in the affiliates of U.S. multinational 
companies. Using data from three benchmark surveys, they have access to data on a total of 
32,000 affiliates and 3,600 parents. They find evidence that tax rates strongly affect the use of 
debt by affiliates, in which 10 percent higher tax rates are associated with 2.8 percent higher 
debt-to-asset ratios. Internal debt is particularly sensitive. While the estimated elasticity of 
external borrowing with respect to tax rate is 0.19, the estimated elasticity of borrowing from 
parent companies is 0.35. Multinational affiliates are financed with less external debt in countries 
with underdeveloped capital market or weak creditor rights due to higher local borrowing costs. 
These affiliates substitutes three-quarters of the reduced external borrowing with debt from 
parent company. In this case, it seems that multinational companies utilise internal capital 
markets to overcome imperfections in external capital markets. 
 Møen et al (2011) point out that the key driver for both domestic and multinational 
companies’ capital structure is the debt tax shield. However, multinational companies have the 
advantage in utilising debt shifting mechanism both internal and external debt. They find out that 
a 10 percentage point of tax increase in an affiliate located in country with the highest tax rate 
will reduce the debt-to-asset ratio in the low-tax country by 1.4 percentage points and increase 
the debt-to-asset ratio in the high-tax country by 4.6 percentage points. 
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5.2.3. The use of internal debt.  
Buettner and Wamser (2013) confirm that internal debt is used more by multinationals with 
affiliates in low-tax countries and increases with the spread between the host country tax rate and 
the lowest tax rate among all affiliates. Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) find that a one 
percentage point increase in the host country's tax rate raises leverage in wholly-owned foreign 
affiliates by about 0.4 percentage points. Most of the effect comes from increased intra-firm 
borrowing (i.e. internal lending) and not from third party debt. Further, Overesch and Wamser 
(2010) confirm that there is a significant impact of tax-rate differentials on the use of inter-
company debt.  
5.3. The use of chains of ownership  
Desai, Foley and Hines (2002) show that indirectly owned foreign affiliates exhibit strong tax 
effect in which 10 percent higher tax rates is associated with 12.0 percent lower FDI and 1.4 
percent lower returns on assets. American firms finance their foreign operations indirectly 
through chains of ownership which now account for more than 30 percent of aggregate foreign 
assets and sales. These ownership chains are particularly concentrated among European affiliates. 
In addition, Huizinga et al (2008, p.5) also mention that in practice, multinational companies may 
be able to avoid bilateral withholding taxes through triangular arbitrage involving a conduit 
company in a third country.  
5.4. The use of holding company, trusts and tax havens 
Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) point out that, multinational companies may reduce 
their tax liability abroad by granting intra-company loans to their foreign affiliates. Some loop-
holes in tax regulation (such as the preference for holding companies) allow them to do that and 
to work around thin capitalisation rules. By the use of such holdings, multinational companies 
may shift debt from productive affiliates to holdings (Ruf and Schindler, 2012). 
 Huizinga et al (2008) look at different methods to transfer profits from subsidiaries to the 
parent company and find out that withholding tax has a bigger effect on debt than the tax rate in 
the home country. This may imply that subsidiaries would prefer to defer the repatriation of the 
profits and try to use a third country to work around the repatriation tax.  
 Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) point out that larger, more international firms, and those with 
extensive intra-firm trade and high R&D intensities, are the most likely to use tax haven. The 
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evidence suggests that the primary use of affiliates in larger tax haven countries is to reallocate 
taxable income, whereas the primary use of affiliates in smaller tax haven countries is to facilitate 
deferral of U.S. taxation of foreign income. Firms with sizeable foreign operations benefit the 
most from using tax haven. Evidence shows that American firms are more likely to establish new 
tax haven operations if their non-haven investments are growing rapidly – one percent greater 
sales and investment growth in nearby non-haven countries is associated with a 1.5 to 2 percent 
greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven operation.  
5.5. Conclusion 
Relevant literature review shows that multinational companies, mostly the American ones try to 
minimise the tax liability using the methods mentioned in the theory part. In Norway, however, 
the intensity of this practise is less well-documented. One of the reasons can be the fact that 
Norwegian tax rate is among the average and that there has not been so much focus on research 
about this particular topic both for Norwegian multinational companies or foreign-owned 
multinational companies operating in Norway.  
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6. CASE ANALYSIS: MICROSOFT CORP. 
In this section, analysis of Microsoft Corp. is performed to show how a multinational company 
minimises its tax liability. Focusing on one firm gives real and explicit example on how tax 
consideration affects the decision of the firm’s business strategy. 
 Compared to Apple Inc. and Google, Microsoft Corp. received less attention in their tax 
planning. However, on May 21, 2013, Business Insider published that Microsoft had a massive 
system by which to avoid taxation. Microsoft Corp. and other U.S. corporations used the flaws in 
the international corporate tax regime to minimise their tax exposure. According to the full senate 
report on September 20, 2012, the company had reported income of $23.2 billion, but with a 
federal tax liability of only $3.11 billion paid as an effective rate of 13.4 percent. This was much 
lower than the statutory corporate tax rate of 35 percent in the United States. Day (2014) wrote 
that Microsoft Corp. sued IRS for details of tax probe. The main issue was transfer pricing 
between Microsoft’s subsidiaries. IRS was investigating this issue as Microsoft Corp.’s effective 
tax rate in June 2014 was 21 percent below the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate.  
In their Annual Report 2014, Microsoft Corp. made statement as follows:  
'Our effective tax rate was lower than the U.S. federal statutory rate primarily due to earnings 
taxed at lower rates in foreign jurisdictions resulting from producing and distributing our 
products and services through our foreign regional operations centres in Ireland, Singapore, and 
Puerto Rico.' 
(Microsoft annual report 2014, p.29) 
However, they did not go further in details on how they managed to lower the effective tax rate 
through their worldwide operation. Therefore, using Microsoft Corp. annual reports, public finan-
cial information, i.e. Orbis database and Brønnøysundegistrene, and other printed and online 
public information available, the tax minimisation strategies used and the effects of these 
practices will be discussed.  
6.1. Background 
Microsoft Corp. is a worldwide leading technology firm that generates revenue: by developing, 
licensing, and supporting a wide range of software products and services; by designing, manufac-
turing, and selling devices related to computing; and by delivering online advertising to global 
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customers.18 Microsoft refers to Microsoft Corp. and its affiliates, including Microsoft Mobile 
Oy, a subsidiary of Microsoft that develops, manufactures and distributes Lumia and Asha and 
Nokia X mobile phones and other devices.19 
 The firm was founded in 1975. On June 25, 1981, it was incorporated in the state of 
Washington. Then, it was reincorporated in the state of Delaware on September 19, 1986, and 
reincorporated in the state of Washington on November 1, 1993 (Levin and Coburn, 2012). Bill 
Gates, the co-founder of the firm is the Technology Advisor’s Board of Director.20 
 As of June 30, 2014, Microsoft employed 128,000 people worldwide (in which 62,000 are in 
the United States and 66,000 internationally), and reported revenues of $86,833 million. Of the 
total employees: 44,000 were in product R&D; 33,000 in sales and marketing; 23,000 in product 
support and consulting services; 20,000 in manufacturing and distribution; and 11,000 in general 
and administration. Microsoft does more than 85 percent of the R&D in Redmond, Washington, 
the United States. 
6.2. Microsoft’s global structure 
Microsoft began establishing a complex network of interrelated foreign entities to facilitate 
international sales and reduce U.S. and foreign tax. They established three regional operating 
centres in tax havens: Dublin, Ireland; Singapore; and Humacao, Puerto Rico.21 There are roles 
assigned to each of these operation centres: Microsoft Ireland has a role for licensing, manu-
facturing, operations and logistic and is responsible for retail sales to Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa (EMEA); Singapore is for operations and logistics and responsible for retail sales in Asia 
and Pacific; and Puerto Rico is for manufacturing and responsible for retail sales in North and 
South America, including the United States (Levin and Coburn, 2012). In addition, there is an 
operation centre for licensing and operation in Reno, Nevada,22 a tax haven in the United States.   
 Microsoft makes effort to maximise profits held in these operating centres in order to redu-
ce the tax liabilities (Levin and Coburn, 2012). The firm confirms this effort in its statement in 
their annual report. It seems that tax minimisation is the main consideration in structuring the 
global operation. 
18 United States. Microsoft Corporation. (2014a) Annual report 2014. 
19 United States. Microsoft Corporation. (2014b) Revenue and Headcount.  
20 United States. Microsoft Corporation. (2014b) Revenue and Headcount. 
21 United States. Microsoft Corporation. (2014c)  
22 United States. Microsoft Corporation. (2014a)  
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6.3. Microsoft’s tax payment 
Stated in their annual report, Microsoft pays taxes that are lower than U.S. statutory tax. As 
showed in table 6.1, in the fiscal year 2014 and 2013, Microsoft reported $5,746 million and 
$5,189 million in taxes on taxable income of $27,820 million and $27,052 million. The amount 
of tax paid was 20.65 percent and 19.18 percent respectively (i.e. 14.35 and 15.82 percentage 
points lower than the U.S. statutory tax rate of 35 percent). 
Year 2014 2013 
Operating revenue (turnover) 86,833 77,849 
Costs of goods sold 21,722 16,494 
Other operating expenses 37,331 34,799 
Financial P/L 40 496 
Taxable Income 27,820 27,052 
Tax 5,746 5,189 
Net Income 22,074 21,863 
($ millions) 
Table 6.1. Microsoft tax payment in 2014 and 2013 
As a multinational firm, Microsoft deals with different tax rates and regulations in all its affiliate 
locations worldwide. Most of these tax rates are lower than the U.S. statutory tax rate. This fact is 
the starting point on how Microsoft end up paying taxes which are lower than 35 percent.  
The following sections will analyse how Microsoft minimise the tax liabilities.  
6.4. Deferral 
Microsoft is one of the U.S. multinational companies with the largest amount of money held 
offshore after Apple Inc. Table 6.2 shows the amount of the foreign cash held outside the United 
States for the biggest U.S. multinational companies. Looking at it enlarges the magnitude of the 
loss in tax revenue for the U.S. government. In 2013, Microsoft with $76,400 million held 
offshore gave estimated deferred tax bills of $24,400 million23. It implies tax rate paid offshore 
cash at 3.1 percent.24  
 
23 United States. Microsoft Corporation. (2013) 
24 To calculate the tax rate paid abroad, the estimated tax bill is divided by the total amount kept offshore. The 
number is then multiplied by 100 equals the U.S. tax rate the company would pay if it repatriated that foreign cash. 
Since company receives dollar-for-dollar credits for taxes paid to foreign governments, the tax rate paid abroad is the 
difference between 35% - the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate – and the tax rate paid upon registration. (i.e. 35% - 
($24,400/$76,400 * 100) = 3.06%) 
 
 
                                                          
46 
  
Company Amount Held Offshore ($millions) 
Apple Inc. 111,300 
Microsoft Corp.  76,400 
Google 38,900 
Oracle Corp. 26,200 
Intel 20,000 
Dell 19,000 
Table 6.2. Cash booked offshore by top technology companies for tax purposes 2008 and 2013 
(Phillips, Wornhoff, and Smith, 2014).  
 As seen on the table 6.3, Microsoft has been increasing the cash reserve outside the United 
States and around 90 percent25 of the total cash are left overseas, particularly in tax havens. This 
“offshore” cash is not taxable and will only be taxed when it is repatriated into the United States. 
It implies that the U.S. government suffered from tax loss amounted as high as $27,895 million26 
per 2014 and received only $2,103 million27 in tax revenue from the cash that was repatriated.  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total cash 36,788 52,772 63,040 77,022 85,709 
Foreign cash Not available 45,379 54,660 70,480 79,700 
Foreign cash as a % of total cash -- 85.99% 86.71% 91.51% 92.99% 
($ millions) 
Table 6.3. Cash and equivalents, Short term investments.28 
In their annual report, Microsoft states:  
'We earn a significant amount of our operating income outside the U.S., which is deemed to be 
permanently reinvested in foreign jurisdictions.  
....We currently do not intend nor foresee a need to repatriate these funds.' 
(Microsoft annual report 2014, p.34).  
By stating the intention in keeping the foreign income outside the United States permanently and 
using it for investment in the foreign subsidiaries, Microsoft is able to defer tax liability on this 
foreign income, utilising accounting standard APB 23. However, a Wall Street Journal Investi-
gation found that over 90 percent of Microsoft's “offshore” cash were actually invested by its 
offshore subsidiaries in the U.S. assets like Treasuries, allowing the company to benefit from the 
25 Average percentage in year 2011-2014 based on table 6.3. 
26 $ 79,700 million * 0.35 = $ 27,895 million 
27 ($ 85,709 million - $ 79,900 million) * 0.35 = $ 2,103 million 
28 United States. Microsoft Corporation. (2014a).  
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stability of the U.S. financial market without paying taxes on those profits (Phillips et al, 2014). 
Further, Microsoft also mentioned that approximately 84 percent of the “offshore” cash were 
invested in U.S. government and agency securities, 5 percent were invested in corporate notes 
and bonds of U.S. companies, and 1 percent were invested in U.S. mortgage backed security.29  
 Figure 6.1 shows that the portion of the U.S. investment had increased from 59 percent in 
2009 to 80 percent in 2014.  Comparing the increase in the total investment and the U.S. invest-
ment from 2009 to 2014, the former increased by 162 percent, while the latter increased by 253 
percent. The other investment itself only increased by 28.5 percent. It implies that more and more 
“offshore” cash were brought back to the United States in the form of investment. It is clear that a 
U.S. multinational company such as Microsoft can always find a way to bring back the profits to 
the United States without being subject to repatriation tax.  
 
*  including cash, mutual funds, commercial paper, certificates of deposit, foreign government bonds,  municipal 
 securities, common and preferred stock and other investments. 
** U.S. government and agency securities, mortgage-backed security and corporate notes and bonds. 
Figure 6.1. Microsoft investment 2009-2014. 
 Microsoft also uses the foreign cash to acquire their foreign subsidiaries. For tax purpose, 
Microsoft acquired Skype (headquartered in Luxembourg at the time of acquisition) through 
Round Island One. By using this "triangular strategy", Microsoft owned Skype, but they did not 
have equity in Skype as Microsoft used the foreign cash from other affiliates held by Round 
Island One to make the payment. This transaction was "active" investment as Round Island One 
29 United States. Microsoft Corporation. (2014a).  
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had more than ten percent ownership (in fact the ownership was 100 percent). Therefore, 
Microsoft could still defer the U.S tax on the foreign income. Another earlier transaction using 
"multiple-tiers strategy" was when Microsoft established MACS Holdings to own MOPR, but 
then passed the ownership of MACS Holdings to Round Island One.  
 In the other hand, Microsoft defers the costs in the United States (Gleckman, 2013). These 
costs included R&D, sales and marketing, and general and administrative expenses.30 Microsoft 
products are mostly developed in the United States in the main R&D facilities in Redmond, 
Washington. However, through cost sharing agreement,31 Microsoft U.S. only contributes 35 
percent of the total R&D costs, even though Microsoft U.S. pools and books the world-wide 
R&D costs in its consolidated financial report.  
 As shown in table 6.4, pooling the R&D costs in the United States reduced Microsoft taxable 
income, thus, reduced the tax payments. Through this strategy, Microsoft managed to reduce the 
total tax payment by $8,339 million32 for year 2009-2014. This was the amount the U.S. govern-
ment lost in their tax revenue. 
Year 2009  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Pooled R&D costs 9,010 8,714 9,043 9,811 10,411 11,381 
Increase in revenue if the R&D 
cost is not pooled 5,857 5,664 5,878 6,377 6,767 7,398 
Effective tax rate (%) 26.50  25.00 17.53  23.75  19.18  20.65  
Increase in tax payment 1,552 1,416 1,030 1,515 1,298 1,528 
($ millions) 
Table 6.4. Pooled cost in the United States.33 
6.5. The use of subsidiaries in tax havens.  
Microsoft reported 10 subsidiaries in tax havens in 2007, but disclosed only five in 2013. These 
subsidiaries were located in Ireland (3), Luxembourg (1) and Singapore (1). During the same 
period, the company increased the amount of money held offshore from $6.1 billion to $76.4 
billion. The estimated U.S. tax bill on this offshore cash is $24.4 billion, implying a tax rate of 
just 3.1 percent34 to foreign government on those profits. It suggested that most of the cash was 
booked in tax havens (Phillips et al, 2014). The same method is common for other U.S. multi-
30 United States. Microsoft Corporation. (2014a) 
31 This topic is discussed further in chapter 6.6.1 
32 1,552 + 1,416 + 1,030 + 1,515 + 1,298 + 1,528 = 8,339 ($ millions) 
33 Data is taken from Microsoft Annual Report 
34 For calculation, see footnote 26 in chapter 6.4 
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national companies that hold the money offshore where most of them having subsidiaries in tax 
haven as shown below. 
Company Number of tax haven subsidiaries 
Apple Inc. 3 
Microsoft Corp.  5 
Google 2 
Oracle Corp. 6 
Intel 13 
Dell 79 
Table 6.5. Top technology companies with their tax haven subsidiaries (Phillips et al, 2014). 
 Microsoft also uses the subsidiaries in tax havens as operation centres (see chapter 6.2). The 
purpose of locating the operation centres in these tax havens and low tax jurisdiction is to 
minimise the tax liability on the income received.  
6.6. Internal pricing (transfer price) 
6.6.1. "Buy-in" and cost sharing agreement 
Microsoft transfers the IP economic rights to the subsidiaries located in foreign tax havens, i.e. 
Ireland, Bermuda and Puerto Rico (later they are called IP-Holding entities).35  
Entity name  Country registration Economic rights 
Flat Island Company  Ireland Economic rights to IP for certain products in EMEA 
Microsoft Ireland 
Research (MIR) Ireland 
Economic rights to IP for certain 
products in EMEA 
Microsoft Asia Island Ltd. 
(MAIL) Bermuda 
Economic rights to IP for certain 
products in Asia Pacific 
Microsoft Operation 
Puerto Rico (MOPR) Puerto Rico 
Economic rights to IP for certain 
products in the America 
Table 6.6. Microsoft non-U.S. subsidiaries that own or share economic rights to any IP developed 
in the US (Levin and Coburn, 2012). 
 A worldwide cost sharing agreement between Microsoft and these IP-Holding entities is 
formed to facilitate this transfer. Cost sharing agreement is chosen because transfer of full-
fledged intangible triggers taxation due to its hidden reserves and future incomes generated by 
the intangible (Fuest, et al, 2013). In this agreement, Microsoft pools its worldwide R&D costs 
while each of the IP-Holding entities pays a portion of the R&D costs based on the their portion 
35 Microsoft only transfer the IP's economic rights, the right to profit from the intellectual property. The ownership of 
the IP and the legal enforce patent protection is still in the Unites States. 
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of global revenue. Microsoft’s Irish operating centres account for 30 percent of the firm’s global 
revenue, so MIR contributes 30 percent of the cost of R&D to the global cost share pool; Micro-
soft’s Puerto Rico operating centre (MOPR) contributes 25 percent; Microsoft Singapore opera-
ting centre (MAIL) contributes 10 percent; and Microsoft U.S. contributes 35 percent.36 
Microsoft Ireland, Microsoft Singapore, and Microsoft Puerto Rico, then, each obtain the right to 
sell retail products in their respective regions. This cost sharing contribution also grants them the 
rights licence of Microsoft products to manufacturers (Levin and Coburn, 2012). 
 In the cost sharing agreement, participating subsidiaries must make a "buy-in" payment first 
time they join in. As mentioned in the theory part, a "buy-in" payment is an initial contribution 
for the development already and undertaken and future payment for the continued development 
of the intangible assets. The amount of the “buy-in” payment should be based on arm’s length 
value. However, due to the unavailability of comparable intangible assets in the market, valuation 
of Microsoft's IPs is not easy. Therefore, this payment can be used as the first step to transfer the 
profit from the United States to the three IP-holding entities by setting the payment lower than 
the arm’s length value. In addition, the agreement takes place while the intangible assets are still 
in the development stage, making the "buy-in" payment lower due to the uncertainty of the future 
economic value that the assets will generate. 
 For Microsoft, the approximate “buy-ins” for each entity was: MAIL $4 billion; MOPR $17 
billion; and MIR $7 billion (Levin and Coburn, 2012). These payments, however, were difficult 
to check in term of their accordance to the arm’s length principle. In addition, these “buy-in” pay-
ments were structured to be paid in several years, so that the IP-Holding entities could get annual 
profits paid to them out of proportion to what they paid (Rubin, 2012). 
 This payment amount created a dispute between IRS and Microsoft in 2014. The reason was 
because IRS thought that the “buy-in” payment was too low based on the standards in the 
regulation at that time. The original agreement gave the right to the IP-Holding entities to “make 
or sell rights”. However, as there were activities for new intangibles development in the IP-
Holding entities, IRS argued that the “buy-in” payment should have been higher (August, 2014). 
 Once the Microsoft's IP rights are transferred offshore, the IP-Holding entities do not sell 
Microsoft products directly to customers. In Ireland and Singapore, the economic rights are 
36 The portion of Microsoft’s business responsible for licensing Microsoft products to manufacturers that pre-
installation Microsoft software is operated primarily out of the United States.  
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immediately relicensed to a different Microsoft subsidiary (later it is called operation entity) (see 
table 6.7) at a substantial mark-up, which then manufactures the products for then being sold to a 
combination of affiliated and third party entities. In addition, these operation entities pay royalty 
to the IP-Holding entities. However, the royalty payments are not disclosed. More details on this 
production process will be discussed in part 6.7. 
 
 
Acquiring 
(operation) entity 
Country 
registration 
Entity receiving 
payment  Rights acquired 
Date 
acquired 
1 
Microsoft Ireland 
Operation Ltd 
(MIOL) 
Ireland Microsoft Island Research (MIR) 
Licence agreement to 
distribute certain products 
in EMEA 
July 1, 
2007 
2 
Microsoft 
Operation Pte 
Limited (MOPL) 
Singapore 
Microsoft Asia 
Island Ltd. 
(MAIL) 
Licence agreement to 
distribute certain products 
in Asia Pacific 
April 3, 
2004 
3 Microsoft Ireland Research (MIR) Bermuda 
Flat Island 
Company 
Licence agreement to 
distribute certain products 
in EMEA 
July 1, 
2007 
* Royalty payments are undisclosed 
Table 6.7.  Microsoft non-U.S. subsidiaries (operation entities) received the licence rights and 
paid royalties to non-U.S. IP-Holding entities for the development or acquisition of rights in IP 
(Levin and Coburn, 2012). 
 Microsoft U.S. also charges royalty payments from the IP-Holding and the operation entities 
for some other IP rights that are not included in the cost sharing agreement.  As the tax rate in the 
United States is higher than all of the paying royalty subsidiaries, Microsoft does not have any 
incentives to shift the profits to the United States. Therefore, the royalty payments are low (table 
6.8). 
 Acquiring entity 
Entity 
receiving 
payments* 
Rights acquired Type of agreement 
The amount 
2011 
1 
Microsoft 
Operation Pte 
Ltd. 
Microsoft Economic rights to IP for certain products in EMEA 
Cost share 
agreement undisclosed 
2 Flat Island Company Microsoft 
Licence agreement to 
distribute certain products 
in India 
Licence $183 
3 Microsoft Asia Island Ltd. Microsoft 
Economic rights to IP for 
certain products in Asia 
Pacific 
Cost share 
agreement $1,034 
4 Microsoft Asia Island Ltd. Microsoft 
Economic rights to IP for 
certain products in Asia 
Pacific 
Cost share 
agreement $153 
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5 
Microsoft 
Operations 
Puerto Rico, LLC 
Microsoft 
Economic rights to IP for 
certain products in the 
Americas 
Cost share 
agreement $1,900 
6 
Microsoft 
Operations 
Puerto Rico, LLC  
Microsoft 
Economic rights to IP for 
certain products in the 
Americas 
Licence $435 
7 Microsoft Ireland Research (MIR) Microsoft 
Economic rights to IP for 
certain products in EMEA 
Cost share 
agreement $2,053 
8 Microsoft Ireland Research (MIR) Microsoft 
Economic rights to IP for 
certain products in EMEA 
Cost share 
agreement $548 
Table 6.8. Microsoft non-U.S. subsidiaries that paid royalties to U.S. Microsoft entities for the 
development or acquisition of rights to or interest in any IP (Levin and Coburn, 2012). 
6.6.2. Indirect analysis 
In analysing the irregularities in the transfer pricing, analysis on profit margins of the affiliates 
and its relation with the statutory tax rates in the countries the affiliates located is performed.  
 Table 6.9 shows the average statutory corporate tax rate and profit margin from 2009-2013. 
The decision to use the average value is due to changes in tax rate in some countries (e.g. 
Germany and Sweden). The changes are assumed to affect the allocation of profits through 
transfer pricing. Average profit margin is calculated for the correspondent years. One drawback 
in this method is that the changes in tax rate might take years to have effect on the profit shifting.  
Company Country Profit margin37  Tax rate38 
MICROSOFT CORP US 35.81 % 35.00 % 
MICROSOFT ENGINEERING CENTER PARIS France -3.20 % 33.33 % 
MICROSOFT RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
FRANCE SAS France -3.03 % 33.33 % 
MICROSOFT CORP. (INDIA) PVT LTD India 13.91 % 33.22 % 
BRANCH OF MICROSOFT COLOMBIA INC Colombia 12.03 % 31.40 % 
MICROSOFT S.R.L. Italy 12.61 % 31.40 % 
MICROSOFT IBERICA SRL Spain 10.35 % 30.00 % 
MICROSOFT DEUTSCHLAND GMBH Germany 14.95 % 29.45 % 
MICROSOFT NEW ZEALAND LIMITED New Zealand 13.35 % 28.80 % 
MICROSOFT NORGE AS Norway 22.08 % 28.00 % 
MICROSOFT SYSTEM MARKETING. LTD UK 27.32 % 25.80 % 
MICROSOFT AKTIEBOLAG Sweden 18.64 % 25.44 % 
MICROSOFT B.V. Netherlands 12.81 % 25.20 % 
MICROSOFT OESTERREICH GMBH Austria 16.05 % 25.00 % 
37 Profit margin = P/L before tax divided by sales multiply by 100 
38 Average statutory tax rate for period 2009-2013 is calculated based on statutory corporate tax rate from KPMG 
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MICROSOFT DEVELOPMENT CENTER 
COPENHAGEN APS Denmark 22.98 % 25.00 % 
MICROSOFT (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD  Malaysia 11.50 % 25.00 % 
MICROSOFT KOREA INC. Rep. of Korea 17.53 % 24.20 % 
MICROSOFT HELLAS S.A. Greece 13.93 % 23.00 % 
MICROSOFT ESTONIA OU Estonia 12.09 % 21.00 % 
MICROSOFT SLOVAKIA, S.R.O. Slovakia 13.84 % 20.33 % 
MICROSOFT HRVATSKA D.O.O. Croatia 12.49 % 20.00 % 
MICROSOFT HOLDINGS PTE. LTD. Singapore 21.99 % 19.33 % 
MICROSOFT HUNGARY COMPUTER 
TECHNOLOGY SERVICING AND TRADING 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY MICROSOFT 
HUNG 
Hungary 12.36 % 18.40 % 
MICROSOFT OPERATIONS PTE.LTD Singapore 5.64 % 17.20 % 
MICROSOFT LATVIA SIA Latvia 11.76 % 15.00 % 
MICROSOFT BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA D.O.O. 
SARAJEVO 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 24.96 % 10.00 % 
Table 6.9. Average tax rate and profit margin in some of Microsoft subsidiaries 2009-2013.39 
 As mentioned in the previous section, Microsoft has operation centres in Luxembourg, 
Singapore, Puerto Rico and Ireland. However, the financial data available is only for subsidiaries 
in Singapore. There are only Microsoft Round Island One and Microsoft Flat Island company, 
two subsidiaries in Ireland among 22 subsidiaries listed by Orbis, that have key financial 
information (i.e. revenue, profit margin, number of employees, etc). But this information is back 
in 2004. For the subsidiaries in Luxembourg, there are six listed by Orbis, but only Microsoft 
Luxembourg S.A.R.L. that provides financial information until 2012. The average profit margin 
from 2008-2012 is 4.49 percent with corporate tax rate of 28.88 percent.40 It limits the overview 
of how Microsoft allocates the profits across the world, but at the same time it shows that these 
countries as tax havens give protection to Microsoft in terms of secrecy on its financial reports. It 
raises a red flag that these countries are used to allocate most of the profits or channel these 
profits to another tax haven with more profitable taxes.  
 The table is sorted out based on tax rate from the largest to the smallest. If Microsoft shifts 
the profits from high-tax countries to low-tax countries, the profit margin should increase when 
the tax rate decreases. Figure 6.2. shows that there is a negative trend between tax rate and profit 
39 Data for tax rate is taken from KPMG corporate tax rate table and profit margin is taken from Orbis. 
40 Based on Orbis database 
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margin. However, this trend should be tested statistically by using more samples that in this case 
might not be easy as there are many subsidiaries that do not disclose their financial data publicly. 
Therefore, a conclusion that Microsoft shifts the profits from high-tax countries to low-tax 
countries based on the relation between tax rate and profit margin alone cannot be drawn.  
 
Figure 6.2. Relationship between tax rate and profit margin  
 Nonetheless, there are some issues to be noticed here. Subsidiaries in Bosnia and Herze-
govina pays tax at the rate of 10 percent and the profit margin is almost double compared to the 
other subsidiaries that are located in countries with higher (almost double) tax rate. The parent 
company, Microsoft in the United States still has the highest profit margin compared to the other 
non U.S. subsidiaries. But again, as there is no information from the subsidiaries in Ireland (i.e. 
MIOL), Luxembourg and Puerto Rico (i.e. MOPR LLC), it is hard to show that the profit margin 
in these countries are much higher than in the United States and other non-tax havens. 
 The last available data from Microsoft Round Island One in Ireland is 2004, reporting profit 
margin at 39.91 percent with a tax rate of 12.5 percent.41 Even though Microsoft parent company 
pays 35 percent statutory corporate tax rate, in reality the effective tax rate is far below that.  
 Profit margin for Business Software and Services industry is 19.9 percent42 and Microsoft's 
profit margin has been 22.15 percent on average for the last five years. Compared to the peer 
companies such as Oracle, Apple and Qualcomm, their profit margins are 26.75, 24.16 and 27.78 
percent respectively.43 All of these companies do have subsidiaries in tax havens.  However, 
looking back to the Microsoft Round Island One's profit margin which was as high as 39.91 
41 Based on Orbis database 
42 Based on Yahoo Finance (http://biz.yahoo.com/ic/m/msft.html) accessed on March 23, 2015. 
43 Based on TCharts (http://ycharts.com/companies/MSFT/profit_margin) 
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percent in 2004, there is a possibility that this profit margin is higher now. Microsoft Round 
Island One is still active,44 but without public financial data disclosure.  
6.7. Production and distribution 
As mentioned, Microsoft has managed to lower their effective tax rate through their foreign 
regional operation centres in Ireland, Singapore and Puerto Rico. Their production and operation 
are discussed as follows. 
6.7.1. Puerto Rico 
Microsoft Operation Puerto Rico LLC (MOPR) is a legal entity that runs Microsoft’s Puerto 
Rican regional operating centre. MOPR is a wholly owned Microsoft CFC. It maintains a 
production facility in Puerto Rico and is responsible for the manufacturing and replication of 
retail software.  
 MOPR was established in 2005 in response to the elimination of Section 936, a section in 
IRS which stated that income earned by U.S firms from operations in U.S. possessions was 
effectively exempt from federal corporate income taxes (U.S. GAO, 1993). Microsoft established 
MOPR with funds from a wholly-owned Irish affiliate, Round Island One, to make MOPR owned 
by Microsoft’s Irish group. To realise this plan, Microsoft established MOPR and Bermuda hol-
ding entity called MACS Holdings (MACS). MACS served as the sole owner of MOPR. The U.S 
group then transferred the ownership of MACS to Round Island One in a non-taxable transaction 
under section of 368 of the Internal Revenue Code (Nitti, 2014). As the owner of MOPR, Round 
Island One paid for construction of Puerto Rican manufacturing facilities and MOPR’s cost 
sharing obligation. In addition, MOPR received $1.6 billion in equity from its Irish parent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. MOPR ownership structure. 
44 Based on Orbis database 
100% 
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Microsoft Corp 
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 Through cost sharing agreement, MOPR manufactures, duplicates and sells Microsoft soft-
ware and physical products. MOPR sells the individual copies to entities in the United States as 
part of a distribution agreement. The U.S. subsidiaries purchase the products in Puerto Rico, 
transport them to the United States mainland, and then sell them to consumers. The report from 
the U.S. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs mentions that the U.S. enti-
ties retain 53 percent of the gross profits and send the remaining 47 percent to MOPR in Puerto 
Rico where it is taxed at pre-negotiated rate at around two percent.45  
 This structure is not designed for business or manufacturing purpose, but for minimising tax 
on sales of product sold in the United States. In 2011, MOPR paid Microsoft U.S. $1.9 billion as 
part of MOPR’s cost sharing obligations. MOPR then reported $4 billion in profits in 2011, 
which was taxed at 1.02 percent. For this year only Microsoft reduced its tax payment by $1.36 
billion.46 During three years when the firm was surveyed by the Subcommittee on Homeland 
Security, Microsoft saved over $4.5 billion in taxes on goods sold in the United States by using 
this structure (Levin and Coburn, 2012). 
 
         
    
 
            
 
Figure 6.4. Microsoft Intellectual Property Payments (Puerto Rico) in 2011.47 
 It would have been possible to calculate the tax saving that Microsoft gain, i.e. the tax 
revenues that the U.S. government loses had there been data on this. Unfortunately, there is no 
financial data available for MOPR from Orbis. However, it is mentioned that offshore profits 
through Puerto Rico office saves $4 million a day in taxes (Birrel, 2014). It means that in a year, 
the U.S. government loses $1.46 billion on tax revenue. This amount is only from one Microsoft 
offshore office, not from the all three and the other U.S. multinational companies.  
45 Most of the information in this sub chapter is taken from Levin and Coburn (2012)   
46 $4 billion * (0.35-0.0102) = $1.3592 billion 
47 Based on preparation by the U.S: Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, September 2012. 
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6.7.2. Ireland 
Microsoft coordinates all product sales for EMEA areas through a group of entities in Ireland. 
Microsoft Round Island One is a wholly owned Microsoft CFC which operates in Ireland. It 
owns Microsoft Ireland Research (MIR), a trust company and a wholly owned disregarded CFC 
located in Ireland.48 
 MIR entered cost sharing agreement with Microsoft Corp. and relicensed its IP rights to ano-
ther wholly-owned, disregarded subsidiary, MIOL, for $9 billion in 2011. There was no tax pay-
ment for this licence payment from MIOL to MIR because under the check-the-box regulations, 
MIOL was a disregarded entity of MIR. It means that licence payment made by MIOL to MIR is 
ignored as for tax purpose they are not considered to be payments between separate entities. 
MIOL, then, manufactures and sells copies of the Microsoft products.49  
 Through this structure, MIR reported $4.3 billion of profits in 2011, with an effective tax 
rate of 7.2 percent. In the same year, MIOL reported profits of $2.2 billion and an effective tax 
rate of 7.3 percent (Levin and Coburn, 2012). In 2014, MIOL revenue was $22.2 billion. It repor-
ted pre-tax profit of $1.4 billion, with effective tax rate of 14.4 percent and tax bill of around 
$221.5 million50 (U.S. Microsoft Corp, 2015b). This tax was lower than it would have been in the 
United States. 
 
         
            
 
           
 
 
Figure 6.5. MIOL ownership and intellectual property payment 
48 Based on Orbis database. 
49 Most information is taken from Levin and Coburn, 2012. 
50 €204 million*1.0859 $/ € = $ 221.52 (exchange rate is taken from Bloomberg on April 2, 2015) 
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 Microsoft also owns a large U.K. operation through Round Island One. However, the com-
pany was able to avoid reporting profits on the sales in the Britain in 2004 by showing that it did 
not have “permanent establishment” in the United Kingdom; that the U.K. operation was called 
marketing with Ireland-based sales staff and that profits was made in Britain, but real business 
was done from Ireland (Simpson, 2005). 
6.7.3. Singapore  
Asian sales are coordinated through a group of entities located in Singapore. This group entered 
into a global cost sharing agreement via MAIL. MAIL is an indirectly wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Microsoft Corporation which is located in Bermuda (Nokia Corp., 2014). It shares 10 percent 
of Microsoft’s global R&D expenses, but conducts no R&D activities. As a part of this agree-
ment, MAIL paid $1.2 billion to the U.S. parent in 2011.  
 MAIL licenses the right to sell Microsoft products in Asia directly to a Singapore entity, 
MOPL for $3 billion. MAIL and MOPL are both wholly-owned disregarded CFCs owned by 
Microsoft Singapore Holdings Pte.Ltd., a wholly-owned CFC of Microsoft Corp.  
 The Singapore group had licensed Microsoft’s products directly from Microsoft U.S. via 
MOPL before MAIL was founded in 2003. In 2004, when MAIL entered into the cost sharing 
agreement with Microsoft U.S with the fund from Singapore Holdings Pte.Ltd., MOPL termina-
ted its licence agreement with Microsoft U.S. and entered into a licence agreement with MAIL. 
Microsoft saved $1,050 million because no tax payment to the United States was made for this 
transaction as both affiliates were disregarded CFCs (Levin and Coburn, 2012).  
 Even though MAIL is a shell company with no employee, in 2011 it reported $1.8 billion in 
earnings and effective tax rate of 0.3 percent. The status of the company is still active, but recent 
financial data is not available in the Orbis database. This is not surprising as it is a shell company 
and located in Bermuda. In 2011, MOPL generated $4.8 billion in revenues from the sale of 
Microsoft products and a profit of $592 million with an effective tax rate of 10.6 percent. From 
this operation, Microsoft reduced its tax bill by $2.43 billion on passive income payments 
between MIOL and MIR (Levin and Coburn, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
  
 
         
            
 
           
 
 
Figure 6.6. MIOL ownership and intellectual property payments in 2011 
 This structure saved Microsoft from tax payment on the $3 billion of licence income that 
MAIL received from MOPL. At the same time, by having MOPL licences from MAIL, Microsoft 
can transfer the profit from Singapore to Bermuda without being taxed by the U.S. government as 
these both affiliates are disregarded CFC owned by Microsoft Singapore Holdings Pte.Ltd. 
6.7.4. Nevada 
Within the United States, Microsoft uses its subsidiary in tax haven state, Nevada, to manage the 
rights and copyrights of Microsoft’s products (Simpson, 2005). There is no tax on corporate 
income including royalty income of IP in Nevada (U.S. Tax Foundation, 2015). Therefore, 
Microsoft assigned this subsidiary with role of licensing, the same role as Round Island One, for 
tax minimisation purpose. This purpose was acknowledged by Microsoft’s Executive Vice 
President and General Counsel Brad Smith in 2004: “...to put Microsoft Licensing Incorporated 
in Nevada in part to recognize the lower tax rate that was in place there….” (Reifman, 2014). 
The Nevada unit, Round Island LLC, is the corporate parent of Round Island One (Simpson, 
2005). However, search in the Orbis database gave a result that Round Island One LLC is a 
Single location company without information about any related companies. At the same time, as 
previously mentioned, Round Island One is owned by RI Holdings, registered in Bermuda. This 
inconsistency in ownership structure increases the conviction of tax minimisation plan. Either 
way around the result would be whether the profits end up in Bermuda or in Nevada (both are tax 
havens) untaxed by the U.S. tax authorities. 
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6.8. Thin capitalisation 
Debt is tax deductible, but not equity. Therefore, as mention in the theory part, debt is preferred 
to equity. By loading the affiliates in the high-tax countries with debt and at the same time 
reducing debt in the affiliates in the low-tax countries, Microsoft can gain higher net debt tax 
shields. This method of debt shifting can be done by using internal and external debt. However, 
due to the unavailability of the data that provide this differentiation, total debt is used in the 
analysis. This is based on the assumption that the debts stated in the annual report are total debt. 
 In the consolidated annual report 2014, Microsoft Corp. as the parent company has the 
financial structure as shown in figure 6.7.  
 
Figure 6.7. Consolidated financial structure 2014 
At parent level, Microsoft has a high ratio of equity accounted for 52 percent. However, the 
equity ratio in affiliate level can be different because as an international company, Microsoft has 
the ability to shift debt externally and internally across its affiliates globally. 
 Table 6.10 shows average statutory corporate tax rate and equity ratio in each subsidiary in 
different countries. Consistent with the theory of the incentive of using debt, higher tax rate 
should lead to higher debt-to-asset ratio (i.e. lower equity ratio). Microsoft Development Centre 
Copenhagen APS has the highest equity ratio of 97.57 percent with the tax-rate of 25 percent in 
Denmark, while the lowest equity ratio of 18.04 percent is found in Italy with the tax-rate of 
31.40 percent. Only looking at the distribution, it is hard to see the significant sign that tax-rate is 
the driving force in using debt.  
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Company Country Tax rate Equity 
MICROSOFT DEVELOPMENT CENTER COPENHAGEN APS Denmark 25.00 % 97.57 % 
MICROSOFT BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA D.O.O. SARAJEVO Bosnia and Herzegovina 10.00 % 88.81 % 
MICROSOFT HUNGARY COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 
SERVICING AND TRADING LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANY MICROSOFT HUNG 
Hungary 18.40 % 65.36 % 
MICROSOFT SYSTEM MARKETING LIMITED United Kingdom 25.80 % 64.64 % 
MICROSOFT CORPORATION (INDIA) PVT LTD India 33.22 % 58.80 % 
MICROSOFT HRVATSKA D.O.O. Croatia 20.00 % 58.54 % 
MICROSOFT SLOVAKIA, S.R.O. Slovakia 20.33 % 58.33 % 
MICROSOFT HOLDINGS PTE. LTD. Singapore 19.33 % 57.75 % 
MICROSOFT LATVIA SIA Latvia 15.00 % 57.62 % 
MICROSOFT CORP United States 35.00 % 53.71 % 
MICROSOFT IBERICA SRL Spain 30.00 % 52.45 % 
MICROSOFT NEW ZEALAND LIMITED New Zealand 28.80 % 49.13 % 
MICROSOFT B.V. Netherlands 25.20 % 48.49 % 
BRANCH OF MICROSOFT COLOMBIA INC Colombia 31.40 % 44.06 % 
MICROSOFT OPERATIONS PTE.LTD Singapore 17.20 % 40.58 % 
MICROSOFT ESTONIA OU Estonia 21.00 % 38.56 % 
MICROSOFT (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD  Malaysia 25.00 % 37.94 % 
MICROSOFT ENGINEERING CENTER PARIS France 33.33 % 35.68 % 
MICROSOFT OESTERREICH GMBH Austria 25.00 % 33.69 % 
MICROSOFT DEUTSCHLAND GMBH Germany 29.45 % 31.81 % 
MICROSOFT AKTIEBOLAG Sweden 25.44 % 30.69 % 
MICROSOFT KOREA INC. Rep. of Korea 24.20 % 29.80 % 
MICROSOFT NORGE AS Norway 28.00 % 22.39 % 
MICROSOFT HELLAS S.A. Greece 23.00 % 21.93 % 
MICROSOFT RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT FRANCE SAS France 33.33 % 19.25 % 
MICROSOFT S.R.L. Italy 31.40 % 18.04 % 
Table 6.10. Equity ratio vs. tax rate51 
 Plotting the table into figure 6.7 gives more clear trend that equity ratio has a negative 
relationship with tax rate (i.e. positive relationship between tax rate and debt ratio). However, this 
trend is only a sign that Microsoft may use debt shifting to maximise its profit globally. This 
finding should be investigated further with more detailed data on both internal and external debt 
to ensure its validity. 
51 Tax rate data is taken form KPMG Corporate Tax Rate and Equity Ratio is from Orbis database. The value is 
average value between 2009-2013 
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Figure 6.8. Equity ratio vs. Tax rate 
6.9. Subpart F avoidance 
Passive incomes, such as royalty and licence income, earned by foreign affiliates of the U.S 
multinationals are subject to immediate taxation and not eligible for deferral. However, if transac-
tion on passive incomes is done between two disregarded CFCs under the check-the-box for tax 
purpose, the taxation under Subpart F is not triggered. This is what Microsoft uses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9. Disregarded CFC (Levin and Coburn, 2012).  
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6.10. Licensing and royalty revenue 
Microsoft’s licensing revenue comes from product revenue, including purchase through volume 
licensing programs, licenses sold to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and retail 
packaged product. This is one of the main business activities of Microsoft. Microsoft licenses the 
products to the customers through the wholly-owned subsidiaries operated in the geographic 
areas where the customers located. As mentioned before, these subsidiaries obtained the right to 
further sell and license Microsoft products from the IP-Holding entities.52 However, as Microsoft 
has moved the IP rights outside the United States, namely to the IP-Holding entities, most of the 
licensing revenue from outside the United States ends up in the country where these IP-Holding 
entities located, i.e. tax havens.  
 Licensing revenue from EMEA is booked in Ireland at MIOL, from Asian area in Singapore 
at MOPL, and from North and South America in Puerto Rico at MOPR. Microsoft does not 
disclose the financial report of these three wholly-owned subsidiaries in the country level. 
Therefore, it is not possible to calculate how much licensing revenue that they receive and how 
much tax saving that Microsoft gains in each operational area/country (i.e. the tax loss for the 
U.S. government). One thing for sure is that Microsoft pays less tax on this licensing revenue as 
the effective tax rates in these three countries are lower than in the United States.53 
 In the annual report 2014, Microsoft reported that licensing fee made up about 50 percent54 
of the total revenue in Device and Consumer segment and 85 percent55 in Commercial segment. 
The proportion of licensing revenue is high. Having this revenue booked in Ireland, Singapore 
and Puerto Rico with their low tax rate, gives a significant reduction in Microsoft's tax liabilities. 
 Microsoft has their own program regarding vendor royalty license and distribution agree-
ment for their independent software vendors (ISV) in each geographic area, but there is no 
disclosure about the royalty/licence fee the ISV has to pay to Microsoft authorized distributors 
(U.S. Microsoft Corp., 2015a).  
 Microsoft enters cost sharing agreement with the operation centres. This allows Microsoft to 
transfer the IP rights to the IP-Holdings and keep most of the royalty and licence fees received 
from the customers and partner in these operation centres as the only obligation from these 
52 Microsoft Annual Report 2014 
53 United States. Microsoft Corporation. (2014a). 
54 $18.803mill/$37.674 mill = 50% 
55 $42.027mill/$49.574 mill = 84.78% 
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operation centres is to pay the portion of the R&D costs they are assigned for. Therefore, the 
income received by these operation centres will not affect the amount of this R&D cost portion 
that in a sense is a replacement for usual royalty.56 However, royalty is used to license the use of 
products to an external company such as Samsung (Mayton, n.d.). 
6.11. Complex and advance company structure. 
Microsoft manages the funding for the establishment of their wholly-owned affiliates in Ireland 
and Puerto Rico through Round Island One, a wholly-owned Irish affiliate (i.e. Microsoft CFC) 
which is owned by RI Holdings. RI Holdings pays no tax as it is located in Ireland, but registered 
in Bermuda. Hence, neither U.S nor Irish authorities will levy any tax from this affiliate. At the 
same time the tax rate in Bermuda is zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* FC: Financial company; IC: Industrial company; TC: Trust company; SC: Shell company 
*        : CFC disregard for tax purpose 
Figure 6.10. Microsoft's operation centre structure.57 
56 Royalty is normally paid in a percentage of sales revenue or an amount per product sold. 
57 The figure is based on the data found in Orbis database 
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 Figure 6.10 shows Microsoft's operation centre structure in the tax havens. Microsoft owns 
RI Holdings, a holding company with industrial company status registered in Bermuda. Registrar 
of Company (ROC) owned by Bermuda Government shows that RI Holdings has been registered 
in Bermuda since 2006 (Bermuda. ROC, n.d.). Through this holding company, Microsoft owns 
Microsoft Round Island One in Ireland, which owns MIR (Ireland), MACS (Bermuda), Microsoft 
Flat Island Company (Ireland), Microsoft Financing International B.V. (Netherland), Skype 
(Ireland), Skype Ireland Technologies Holdings (Ireland), and Microsoft Global Finance Ltd. 
(Ireland). None of these subsidiaries disclose their financial report, except the subsidiary in the 
Netherlands that mentions only the amount of assets and the numbers of its employees which are 
seven.58 Microsoft Financing International B.V. is likely to be used as a shell company in the 
double Irish Dutch sandwich. 
 All the profits from licensing and sales in EMEA market are received by MIOL. MIOL is 
owned by MIR, however, both subsidiaries are disregard CFCs owned by Round Island One. 
Therefore, the transfer of profits to Round Island One will not trigger any U.S. taxation on 
passive income. Ireland will not tax this transfer as Round Island One is the owner of MIR. From 
Round Island One, the profits need to be transferred to RI Holdings in Bermuda. In order to avoid 
withholding tax, the profits are routed to Microsoft Financing International B.V. in the 
Netherlands before being transferred to RI Holdings.  
 Profits from the American market are received by MOPR. These can be channelled to 
MACS Holdings in Bermuda or further to Round Island One in Ireland then to RI Holdings using 
double Irish Dutch sandwich. MOPL owned by MAIL in Bermuda receives profits from Asia 
Pacific market. In the end all the profits would end up in the operation centre or in Bermuda.    
 Even though Microsoft owns these affiliates, the possibility to form disregarded CFC makes 
the ownership more complicated as these affiliates belong to Microsoft, but for tax purpose they 
are independent entities. For example, MOPR in Puerto Rico owned by Microsoft through MACS 
Holdings that is owned by Microsoft Round Island One. Search in Orbis shows Microsoft as the 
majority owner of MOPR, even thought for tax purpose MOPR is a disregarded CFC of 
Microsoft. In addition, amongst 942 subsidiaries that Microsoft has, only 431 that provide 
58 Orbis database 
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information about Microsoft ownership, while the rests are labelled as “single location” with no 
information about the shareholder, or owned by another shareholder which is not Microsoft.59 
6.12. Transparency 
Microsoft operates as a complex network of interconnected entities controlled by Microsoft Corp. 
in the United States. This network includes the subsidiaries that are registered in tax havens. The 
reluctance of Microsoft to disclose the structures and holdings makes it difficult to identify them 
and to understand how they relate to each other. Microsoft reduced the reported number of subsi-
diaries from 10 in 2007 to 5 in 2013, eliminating subsidiaries that are considered significant or 
"material". The Wall Street Journal calls the phenomenon as the "incredible vanishing 
subsidiary". In addition, there are only 112 out of 942 affiliates that disclose their key financial 
report.60 Technology is the worst industry and the United States is the worst country in terms of 
organisational transparency. Microsoft scores 3.4 (0 is least transparent and 10 is most transpa-
rent) in the corporate reporting transparency based on the unweighted average of results in anti-
corruption programmes, organisational transparency and country-by-country reporting (Transpa-
rency International, 2014). 
6.13. Conclusion 
Microsoft avoids the tax liabilities in United States by using three vehicles in international tax 
avoidance: deferral, transfer pricing and check-the-box. Deferral allows Microsoft to avoid U.S. 
withholding tax on foreign income until foreign earnings are brought back to the United States. In 
practice, Microsoft keeps around 90 percent of the foreign cash offshore indefinitely in the opera-
tion centres in tax havens. However, this foreign cash is, in fact, brought back to the United 
States untaxed in the form of investment done by the foreign subsidiaries in the U.S. financial 
market. At the same time, Microsoft pools the R&D cost in the United States.  
 Transfer pricing is used to shift profits from the United States to the IP-Holding entities. 
Almost all value of the Microsoft's products is in the patents and other IPs. Using cost sharing 
agreement and "buy-in" payment, Microsoft manages to transfer the IPs economic rights to IP-
Holdings entities in Ireland, Puerto Rico and Singapore with low transfer price as it is done in the 
early stage of the development of the intangible assets. In this way, Microsoft can shift the profits 
59 Orbis database 
60 Orbis database 
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received from licensing the IPs rights to the customers to these affiliates. In addition, having the 
licensing operation from the tax haven in Nevada also reduces the tax payment for the passive 
income of the IP received in the United States as there is no income tax in this state. 
 By selling the products through the operation centre in Puerto Rico, Microsoft is able to 
divert almost half of its gross profit from American market to Puerto Rico. 
  By using the form of disregarded CFC and check-the-box, combined with the complex and 
advanced company structure and low organisational and financial report transparency, Microsoft 
is able to avoid tax payments for transactions between the disregarded CFC. It allows Microsoft 
to keep moving the IPs to low-tax jurisdictions without paying tax for the transactions. Tax liabi-
lities are also reduced by using double Irish Dutch sandwich involving Microsoft Financing 
International B.V. in the Netherlands, Round Island One in Ireland and RI Holdings in Bermuda.  
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7. CASE ANALYSIS: MICROSOFT IN NORWAY 
This chapter presents the analysis of Microsoft’s operations in Norway with purposes to find and 
show any indications that point out the use of aggressive tax planning. If so, how Microsoft 
conducts this strategy.  
7.1. Microsoft subsidiaries in Norway 
Based on Orbis database, Microsoft has 16 subsidiaries in Norway. However, only four of the 12 
active subsidiaries that provide financial information. These subsidiaries are: Microsoft Norge 
AS, Microsoft Development Center Norway AS, Microsoft Holdings Norge AS, and Microsoft 
Domains Norge AS (figure 7.1). Further, analysis will focus on these four active subsidiaries. 
 
 
                            100%                         100% 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Ownership structure for Microsoft subsidiaries in Norway. 
7.2. Microsoft Norge AS 
Microsoft Norge AS is a limited liability company (AS form in Norwegian) with 297 employees 
in 2014 and share capital of NOK 100,100 in 2013. The company was incorporated in 1990 and 
registered at Brønnøysundregistrene in 1995. Microsoft owns Microsoft Norge AS through 
Microsoft Luxembourg International Mobile S.A.R.L, a subsidiary registered in Luxembourg.61 
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 Microsoft Norge AS engages in distributing, licensing, and supporting a range of software 
products and services for different types of computer devices.62 However, its most important task 
is to arrange its partner to work on the best premises to sell Microsoft’s software and solutions to 
the customers in Norway. There are more than 2000 partners, and around 400 of these are also 
developing software based on Microsoft technological platform. The partners purchase Microsoft 
products directly from the European facility in Ireland.63 
7.2.1. Operation analysis 
The revenue of Microsoft Norge AS is mainly the commission/provision (these two terms will be 
used interchangeably throughout the thesis) from the parent company, Microsoft U.S, through 
MIOL in Ireland.64 The commission, which is six percent,65 is based on the sales of Microsoft 
products in Norway. The sales revenue from Norwegian market, however, is not booked in Nor-
way. It is rather booked in Ireland through Microsoft Luxembourg Mobile S.A.R.L. 
 Eirik Lae Solberg, communication director for Microsoft Norge AS at that time, mentioned 
in  the article by Computer World (2008) that Norwegian customers were billed by MIOL. He 
explained that the licenses the partners sold were produced and distributed by Microsoft in Ire-
land, and MIOL had no activity in Norway (Solli, 2008). This fact made the practice legal, 
looked from the residence-based tax regulation perspective in Norway.  
 However, some of the partners, in fact, are developing software based on Microsoft plat-
form. It is assumed that this software is a part of and used for Microsoft R&D activities. The 
implication would be indirect value added activities in Norway. Thus, the profits from this 
activity should be taxed in Norway. The issue would be how to calculate these profits.   
 Luxembourg has IP-regime that provides 80 percent exemption from corporate income tax 
of 29.22 percent (since 2013)66 for net positive income and capital gains derived from IP acqui-
red or created after 31 December 2007. Thus, the effective tax rate is reduced to 5.84 percent 
(KPMG, 2013). In addition, there is a possibility to have a pre-agreement with the tax authority to 
get an agreed tax rate that is advantageous for Microsoft. Microsoft channels the sales revenue 
from Norwegian market to Luxembourg, taking advantage of lower tax rate there. From Luxem-
62 Orbis database 
63 Financial report from Bronnøysundregistrene, 2013 
64 Financial report from Bronnøysundregistrene, 2013 
65 see chapter 7.2.2 
66 KPMG. (2015) Corporate tax rates table.  
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bourg, the income can be shifted to Ireland without paying any withholding tax due to the tax 
treaty between Luxembourg and Ireland. In this way, Microsoft reduces taxes paid for the income 
from Norwegian market for about 6.66 percentage points.67  
 Through this structure, the sales revenue in Norwegian market is not taxed in Norway. 
According to residence-based taxation of the income, this practice is legal (Green, 1993). 
However, it also implies loss of tax revenue for the Norwegian tax authorities with the thought 
that the income is generated in Norway and that there are value-added activities in the form of 
R&D performed by Microsoft Norge AS partners.  
7.2.2. Commission agreement 
There is no publicly available information about the amount of commission that Microsoft Norge 
AS receives from MIOL. Even contact with management of Microsoft Norge AS does not give 
any result as they mention that it is not accessible for public and that the calculation is rather 
complicated and different for each partner.68 There are descriptions about the general licence, 
royalty agreement and commission, but none of them disclose the exact amount or calculation. 
The only available information states that license or royalty agreement consists of an initial lump 
of royalty payment. Then, there will be a certain percentage that the subsidiaries will receive as 
commission based on the sales. Based on Microsoft Affiliate Program page in Microsoft website, 
table 7.1 shows a list of the provision received by partners for Norwegian market.  
Product Provision 
Software 10 % 
Office 365 monthly 100 % 
Office 365 yearly 10 % 
Xbox 5 % 
Windows Phone 5 % 
Surface 4 % 
Hardware 2 % 
Table 7.1. Provision based on product (Microsoft Corporation, 2015a). 
 Using the assumption that a partnership is a long-term relationship, i.e. excluding the Office 
365 monthly, unweighted average commission is calculated. The average commission is six 
67 12.5% - 5.84% = 6.66% 
68 Based on the answer by CFO Microsoft Norge AS, Anita Huun, regarding the question about the commission. 
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percent.69 Further, with an assumption that Microsoft Norge AS receives the same commission as 
the partners, it is possible to calculate the total sales in Norway based on the commission stated in 
the annual report  
 Table 7.2 shows that from year 2009-2014,70 only NOK 3,472 million of the total sales in 
Norwegian market which were NOK 57,865 million, were recognised as commission revenue for 
Microsoft Norge AS. For the same period, Microsoft Norge AS paid NOK 310.5 million in tax to 
the Norwegian tax authorities. If total sales in Norwegian market had been recognised as the 
revenue for Microsoft Norge AS, i.e. taxable income, the tax payment would have been NOK 
15.4 billion. Dividing the tax paid, i.e. NOK 310.5 million by the taxable income if the sales 
revenue in Norwegian market had been included would have given effective tax rate of 0.56%.71  
MSFT NORGE AS Average Total 
Revenue from commission  578,645,592 3,471,873,550 
Provision  6 % 6 % 
Total sales  9,644,093,194 57,864,559,167 
Revenue from service 144,444,981 866,669,887 
Total revenue 9,788,538,176 58,731,229,054 
Operating costs 575,205,270 3,451,231,622 
Net financial 16,421,970 98,531,820 
Taxable income 9,229,754,875 55,378,529,252 
Tax rate 27.83 %  
Tax liabilities 2,570,888,220 15,425,329,321 
Tax paid 51,753,123 310,518,738 
Tax saving 2,159,135,097 15,114,810,583 
Effective tax rate 0.56% 0.56% 
Reduction in tax liabilities 97.98% 97.99% 
Table 7.2. Revenue and tax payment of Microsoft Norge AS 2009-2014 (in NOK).72 
Total tax saving for Microsoft for the period would have been NOK 15.1 billion or NOK 2.5 
billion annually; this amount was the tax loss for the Norwegian tax authorities due to the loop-
holes in tax-residency based regulation exploited by Microsoft legally. This causes a question and 
attention in term of taxing rights and what the Norwegian government and international tax law 
69 (10%+10%+5%+5%+4%+2%) ÷ 6 = 6% 
70 see appendix 3.b. for the calculation formula 
71 NOK 310,518,738 ÷ NOK 55,378,529,252 = 0.56%. This is rather based on a strong assumption that the sales 
revenue in Norway would have been able to be taxed by Norwegian tax authority 
72 see appendix 3 for more details calculation 
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can do to regulate this practice. The question is shifted to moral perspective, as this practice is 
legal per today's tax regulation.  
7.2.3. Cost analysis 
There is no cost directly related to goods for Microsoft Norge AS as the products sold are directly 
from MIOL. Most of the operating costs are related to salary and other operating costs needed to 
support Microsoft partners in Norway (e.g. service transactions with related parties). As shown in 
table 7.3, the average portion of these costs is 79% of the total revenue booked for Microsoft 
Norge AS. These costs reduce the taxable income and therefore reducing the tax liabilities.  
MSFT NORGE AS Average (NOK) Percentage 
Revenue 723,090,573 100% 
Salary 332,524,723 46% 
Other operating cost 237,817,146 33% 
Total costs 1,293,432,442 79% 
Table 7.3. Average costs 2009-2014 
 Allocation of the costs in Microsoft Norge AS rather than in MIOL is not without purpose. 
The tax rate in Norway is higher than in Ireland. Thus, even though these costs are related to the 
activities done for MIOL, it is more profitable to book the costs in Microsoft Norge AS as they 
will create more reduction in tax payment for Microsoft in total.  
7.2.4. Tax payments 
Despite the effort to reduce tax liabilities in a global level by Microsoft, the effective tax rate for 
Microsoft Norge AS is higher than the statutory corporate tax rate in Norway (table 7.4). A 
possible explanation for this can be some costs that are not tax deductible. Another reason might 
also be that higher effective tax rate would make Microsoft Norge AS look less suspicious in the 
public eye for the practice in avoiding the income tax in Norway. 
MSFT NORGE AS 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Income before tax 216,564,378 192,106,078 125,062,384 113,538,732 163,212,283 175,045,316 
Tax paid 66,645,820 59,520,415 43,200,163 38,919,041 50,934,278 51,299,021 
Effective tax rate 30.77 % 30.98 % 34.54 % 34.28 % 31.21 % 29.31 % 
Table 7.4. Effective tax rate of Microsoft Norge AS 2009-2014 
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7.2.5. Thin capitalisation 
High statutory tax rate in Norway gives incentive for Microsoft to finance the subsidiaries in the 
country with internal debt - reducing the taxable income, thus, reduces the tax liabilities (i.e. 
through internal debt tax shield). Aforementioned in the chapter 5.8, 52 percent of Microsoft 
Corporation's financial structure consists of equity, but in the subsidiary level, it can be different.  
 Data found in the financial report between 2009-2014 mention that Microsoft Norge AS has 
no debt to financial institutions. However, having an assumption that all the debt they have as 
internal debt might not be justifiable as there is not enough information to support that. Annual 
report 2009 explicitly mentions that 62 percent of the short term debt consist of internal debt (i.e. 
NOK 312.06 million). This is 55 percent of the total debt and 4.8 times higher than the equity 
(table 7.5).  
 From year 2010 until 2014, there was no explicit information about the internal debt. At the 
same time, the reports mentioned that the changes in the total debt were due to the changes in the 
intercompany debt, i.e. internal debt. This implies that Microsoft Norge AS still maintained the 
use of internal debt. It is hard to find out where and how they structured this internal debt. There-
fore, the amount of internal debt is calculated based on the amount for 2009 and the changes 
mentioned in the reports, except for the year 2014 where the changes in debt was due to correc-
tion against pension obligation  (table 7.5). The external short term debt is calculated as the diffe-
rence between the total short term debt and the internal short term debt.  
MSFT NORGE AS 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Long term debt 65,049,941 78,148,234 71,545,485 51,473,450 64,121,465 0 
   External 65,049,941 78,148,234 71,545,485 51,473,450 64,121,465 0 
   Internal  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Short term debt 502,401,452 400,272,665 475,116,970 232,021,458 262,587,415 646,897,305 
   External 190,341,452 177,243,159 183,845,908 203,917,943 191,269,928 319,512,858 
   Internal  312,060,000 223,029,506 291,271,062 28,103,515 71,317,487 327,384,447 
   Changes in debt 0 -89,030,494 68,241,556 -263,167,547 43,213,972 320,188,425 
Total debt 567,451,393 478,420,899 546,662,455 283,494,908 326,708,880 646,897,305 
Equity 64,669,029 53,645,324 67,320,859 161,750,919 287,110,211 32,679,421 
Debt/Equity 8.77 8.92 8.12 1.75 1.14 19.80 
Internal/equity 4.83 4.16 4.33 0.17 0.25 10.02 
Internal DTS 87,376,800 62,448,262 81,555,897 7,868,984 19,968,896 88,393,801 
Table 7.5. Debt of Microsoft Norge AS 2009-2014 
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Figure 7.2. Debt and equity of Microsoft Norge AS 2009-2014 
 The capital structure of Microsoft Norge AS mainly consists of debt; this is the opposite of 
what Microsoft Corp. presents. During the period of 2009-2014, the average leverage (i.e. debt-
to-equity ratio) was 8.08 and the average internal debt-to-equity ratio was 3.96. The latter implies 
that the internal debt is almost four times bigger than the equity. Ruf and Schindler (2012) 
calculated safe-harbour ratio of internal debt-to-equity ratio in EU countries in 2008 which was 
3.4:1.73 It implies that any interest expenses on internal debt exceeding the safe-harbour cut-off 
are not tax deductible. In this case, Microsoft Norge AS exceeds the harbour by 0.56. Due to the 
unavail-ability data on the interest rate that Microsoft Norge AS pays for the internal debt, net 
internal debt tax shield cannot be calculated. However the internal debt tax shield for the period is 
NOK 347.6 million.74  
 Since most of the financing comes from debt, especially short term debt, a closer look to the 
assets is necessary to see how the debt is used in the subsidiary. Figure 7.3. shows that Microsoft 
Norge AS is using a moderate approach in its financing as the current assets are financed by 
short-term debt and fixed assets are financed  by long-term debt (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2014). 
73 Calculation is based on Dourado and de la Feria (2008, table 1) 
74 Calculated using tax rate of 28% for 2009-2013 and 27% for 2014 
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Figure 7.3. Average liabilities and assets of Microsoft Norge AS 2009-2014  
7.2.6. Interest income and expenses. 
Even though Microsoft Norge AS mentions the use of internal debt, the information available is 
very limited (see part 7.2.5). From the available information, table 6.4 summarises the interest 
received and paid by Microsoft Norge AS for period 2010-2014. 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Receivables from MS Global Finance (IE)* 0 0 0 426,509,000 529,714,000 
Interest income from MS Global Finance  7,790,694 0 0 6,245,906 7,790,694 
Interest rate from MS Global Finance - - - 1.46 % 1.57 % 
Receivables from Microsoft Corp. (US)* 425,070,752 528,233,000 343,309,000 84,498,000 52,306,000 
Interest income from Microsoft Corp (US) 0 9,836,000 8 893 000 0 0 
Interest rate received from Microsoft Corp. 0.00 % 1.86 % 2.59 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 
External debt 255,391,393 255,391,393 255,391,393 255,391,393 319,512,858 
Other interest expenses** 235,299 285,188 728,474 91,677 112,280 
Interest rate paid for external debt 0,09 % 0,11 % 0,29 % 0,04 % 0,04 % 
Internal debt 223,029,506 291,271,062 28,103,515 71,317,487 327,384,447 
Interest expenses to related company  0 0 0 0 0 
*    For the purpose of the analysis, receivables are treated as loan given by Microsoft Norge AS, i.e. internal debt. 
**  Assumed to be paid to external lender 
Table 7.4. Interest income and payment by Microsoft Norge AS 2010-2014 
The incomplete data make it difficult to make any conclusion on whether Microsoft Norge AS 
uses interest payment to reduce taxable income in Norway by allocating internal debt in this 
subsidiary. Microsoft Norge AS received internal debt from MS Global Finance Ltd. (before 
September 2001, it was known as Microsoft Round Island Two), a financial entity in Ireland 
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owned by Microsoft Round Island One. The internal debt was booked for year 2013 and 2014. 
However, in 2010 there was interest income from internal debt that did not show up in the 
balance sheet. This is puzzling as it raises question on what this money for. In the opposite, even 
though Microsoft Norge AS received internal debt from Microsoft Corp. in 2010-2014, the 
interest income was booked only in 2011 and 2012. Without any further detail information, as 
said, it is not easy to explain what happened.  
 Even though there is internal debt, there is no information about interest expenses related to 
this debt. The annual reports do not disclose this expenses in their notes. This is inconsistent with 
their explicit statement about the use of internal debt within the subsidiary.  
 Based on the information available it is difficult to know or conclude how Microsoft Corp. 
use Microsoft Norge AS in terms of debt shifting. The fact that the interest income in this subsi-
diary is higher that the interest expenses leads to a speculation that it is used to channel the 
money from Microsoft in the United States to Norway, as the tax rate in Norway is lower than in 
the United States. However, it does not makes sense if MS Global Finance Ltd. wants to move its 
profit to Norway through interest payment. For the first reason, Irish tax rate is much lower 
compared to Norwegian. For the second, MS Global Finance Ltd. is a financial entity that has a 
function to finance other subsidiaries and not another way around.   
7.2.7. Sub conclusion 
Microsoft Norge AS is mainly used by Microsoft to support the partners in Norway. Even though 
some of these partners are developing software using Microsoft platform, the firm claims that 
there is no value-added activities in Norway. As a result, there is no sales revenue booked in 
Norway as the goods sold is directly from Ireland and Microsoft Norge AS' revenue is the six 
percent commission received from MIOL based on total sales in Norwegian market. This practice 
is legal per-today based on the residence-based tax regulation. The sales revenue in Norwegian 
market is booked in Ireland (MIR) via Luxembourg (Microsoft Luxembourg  S.A.R.L) to avoid 
Irish income tax.  
 Microsoft books the cost for the activities done for MIOL by Microsoft Norge AS in Norway 
and finances this subsidiary by debt (debt-to-asset ratio in 2014 is 19.80). This reduces the tax 
burden for the operation in Norway. The findings regarding the use of debt shifting to minimise 
the tax liabilities is unsure due to the limited information. 
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7.3. Microsoft Development Center Norway AS  
The company (herein referred to as “MDCN AS”) was established on July 16, 1997 in Oslo. The 
business of MDCN AS is to conduct R&D for Microsoft against compensation. It is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Microsoft through Microsoft International Holdings B.V.75 Based on Orbis 
database, Microsoft International Holdings B.V. is the global ultimate owner (GuO) of MDCN 
AS, and there is no information about its connection with Microsoft Corp. Financial information 
is also not available. This leads to a suspicion that Microsoft International Holdings B.V. is a 
shell company registered in one of the tax haven state in the United States. 
7.3.1. Operation analysis 
MDCN AS is and will continue to be financed by Microsoft. In addition, MDCN AS is a parent 
company in the Group with subsidiaries as shown in the figure 7.1.  
 MDCN AS was known as FAST Search & Transfer AS before it was acquired by Microsoft 
in April 2008 for $1.3 billion in cash.76 The acquisition was done through MACS Holdings Limi-
ted, Microsoft's wholly owned subsidiary registered in Bermuda.77 After acquiring 97.37 percent 
of all the FAST shares outstanding, MACS Holdings Limited initiated acquisition of the 
remaining shares. MACS Holdings Limited also intended to delist FAST share from the Oslo 
Stock Exchange after the acquisition completed (Oslo Børs, 2008). From January 1, 2009, FAST 
sold all the IP for $266 million to Proclarity International B.V., a company owned by Microsoft. 
This transaction exempted MDCN AS from preparing the consolidated financial report.78 Based 
on Orbis database, Proclarity International B.V. is no longer active as it has changed its name to 
Microsoft International Holdings B.V., an industrial company registered in the Netherlands, but 
operates as a full service holding firm.79 The name of this Dutch registered holding company is 
the same as the GuO of MDCN AS. It causes confusion in analysing MDCN AS' real owner.  
 Even thought MDCN AS is located and registered in Norway, the revenue is mainly from 
sales of service activities in North-America (97%). This can be done mainly through FAST-USA. 
 
 
75 Financial report from Bronnøysundregistrene, 2013 
76 United States. Microsoft Corporation (2008) 
77 Financial report from Bronnøysundregistrene, 2007 
78 Financial report from Bronnøysundregistrene, 2009 
79 Orbis database 
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MDCN AS 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average in percentage 
Norway 9,000,000 4,256,000 9,171,000 5,171,000 3 % 
North-America 210,726,000 218,247,000 247,502,000 330,450,000 97 % 
Total revenue 219,726,000 222,503,000 256,673,000 335,621,000 100% 
Table 7.5. Revenue based on geographic area.80 
By moving the revenue from the activities in the United States to Norway, Microsoft can reduce 
its tax liabilities as the tax rate in Norway is lower. 
7.3.2. Commission agreement 
MDCN AS entered a new agreement with Microsoft in 2008. As a result, from July in the same 
year, MDCN AS would no longer perform its own R&D activities and became subcontractor of 
the R&D activities for Microsoft. As a benefit, MDCN AS received a revenue of "sales of 
service" and would no longer have R&D cost; this would reduce the cost. From June until July 
2008, there was no activation of intangible assets and NOK 34 million in R&D was charged as an 
expense. It reduced the taxable income substantially and saved the tax payment for NOK 9.52 
million.81 The net effect was profit shifting from Microsoft in the United States to Norway. 
7.3.3. Cost Analysis 
As table 7.6 shows, the average total cost for 2010-2013 was 111 percent. It implies that MDCN 
AS run deficit in its operation. However, Microsoft keeps the subsidiary. One reason might be 
that Microsoft uses MDCN AS to shift the revenue from the operation in the United States to 
Norway (as shown in table 7.5) to reduce the income tax and at the same time to get the tax 
revenue due to the loss.  
MDCN AS Average cost (NOK) Percentage 
Revenue 256,103,000 100 % 
Salary 218,843,250 85 % 
Other operating cost 64,970,500 30 % 
Total costs 283,813,750 111 % 
Table 7.6. Operating cost of MDCN AS 2010-2013.82 
80 Financial report from Bronnøysundregistrene 
81 NOK 34 million * 0.28 = NOK 9.52 million 
82 Financial report from Bronnøysundregistrene 
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7.3.4. Tax payments 
As mentioned in part 7.2.1, most of MDCN AS comes from North-America. By registering the 
revenue in Norway, Microsoft reduce the taxes by seven percentage points.83 As seen in the table 
7.7, effective tax rate for 2010 was 166.28 percent. However, it had decreased and in 2013 it was 
even less than zero (i.e. -15.27%). Clear conclusion cannot be made based on this data, but it 
seems that shifting the revenue from North-America to Norway combined with high operating 
cost in Norway is profitable for Microsoft in reducing the tax liabilities, i.e. through lower 
effective tax rate.   
MDCN AS 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Income before tax -51,914,000 255,937,000 50,728,000 -111,011,000 
Tax  86,322,000 79,415,000 8,252,000 -16,954,000 
Effective tax rate 166.28 % 31.03 % 16.27 % -15.27 % 
Table 7.7. Effective tax rate 2010-2013  
7.3.5. Thin Capitalisation 
MDCN AS provides limited information about their debt in the annual report. In year 2009, the 
internal debt was NOK 1,969 million, consisted of NOK 5.553 million long-term internal debt 
and NOK 1,963 million short-term internal debt. The internal long-term debt was received from 
Fast Search & Transfer do Brazil S.A. and supposed to be paid in several years.  
 It is expected that MDCN AS will be loaded with internal debt from related companies 
located in the countries with lower tax rate. However, in 2009, it was only NOK 1.118 million 
internal debt which came from Microsoft Global Finance Ltd, a financial entity previously named 
Round Island Two Limited - a holding company registered in Ireland. Microsoft Global Finance 
Ltd. is exempted from filling its own account. It is owned by Microsoft Round Island One 
(Ireland) that again is owned by RI Holdings (Bermuda) that is wholly owned by Microsoft 
(United States). From year 2010 until 2013, the total debt decreased (average debt is NOK 368.3 
million) and there was barely any internal debt reported.  
7.3.6. Interest income and expenses 
Internal debt and investment in its subsidiaries generate interest income as shown in the table 7.8. 
Investment in the subsidiaries is the major financial fixed assets owned by MDCN AS. It seems 
83 35% - 28% = 7% 
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that Microsoft tries to keep the assets outside the United States by investing the profits in the 
subsidiaries both in Norway and outside Norway through MDCN AS.  
MDCN AS 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Interest income from group companies  28,593,000 43,505,000 32,779,000 27,480,000 
Other interest income 330,000 201,000 104,000 32,000 
Received group contributions from subsidiaries 7,315,000 276,663,000 0 0 
     Sum group related activities 36,238,000 320,369,000 32,883,000 27,512,000 
Table 7.8. Interest income and expenses of MDCN AS 2010-2013. 
7.3.7. Sub conclusion 
It seems that Microsoft uses MDCN AS mainly to shift the revenue from North America to 
Norway in order to avoid high tax rate in the United States. The acquisition itself was a way in 
using the foreign cash that was held in MACS Holdings Limited in Bermuda. Despite the revenue 
and interest income receives, MDCN AS run deficit for the period of 2010-2013. This 
combination and the limitation of data available make it difficult to make a justifiable conclusion. 
The speculation can be that Microsoft uses MDCN AS for the R&D purpose and finances the 
cost using the shifted revenue from the North American market.  
7.4. Microsoft Holdings Norge AS 
It is a holding company wholly owned by Microsoft that operates from the same address as 
Microsoft Norge AS. The company was incorporated in June 2006 with a purpose to oversee 
ownership, including purchase and sale of Microsoft domain rights in Norway and other related 
activities. Since the establishment, there has been no employee and only one person on the 
Board.84 The available annual report in year 2009-2014 stated only costs and no revenue, i.e. 
negative income. It also implies that there was no tax liabilities (shown in table 7.9). 
MICROSOFT HOLDINGS NORGE AS 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Income before tax -36,819 -18,750 -31,296 -28,306 -22,645 -12,500 
Tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Effective tax rate 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
Table 7.9. Revenue and tax payment of Microsoft Holdings Norge AS. 
 Since 2009, the amount of equity had been reduced and hit a negative state from 2011until 
2014, where the debt-to-equity ratio was -1, i.e. debt financing replaced the equity completely. 
84 Financial report from Bronnøysundregistrene, 2013 
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There was no long term debt. However, the short term debt consisted of external and internal 
debt, in which the internal debt increased substantially especially from Microsoft Norge AS.   
MICROSOFT HOLDINGS NORGE AS 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Long term debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Short term debt 15,480 1,072 30,318 59,231 82,323 95,247 
    Other creditors (external debt) n.a n.a 0 28,306 22,645 22,645 
    Microsoft Global Finance Ltd (group company) n.a n.a 1,714 2,321 2,768 3,192 
    Microsoft Norge AS (group company) n.a  n.a 28,604 28,604 56,910 69,410 
Equity 27,912 5,613 -30,318 -59,231 -82,323 -95,247 
Debt-to-equity ratio 0.55 0.19 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Table 7.10. Debt of Microsoft Holdings Norge AS 
7.5. Microsoft Domains Norge AS 
It is a wholly owned subsidiary by Microsoft with the same function as Microsoft Holdings 
Norge AS. It was incorporated on March 1, 2007 and there has been no employee.85 Like Micro-
soft Holdings Norge AS, this company also has negative income and debt (i.e. negative equity) 
and zero effective tax rate. 
MICROSOFT DOMAINS NORGE AS 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Income before tax -34,231 -18,750 -31,296 -28,306 -22,645 -12,500 
Tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Effective tax rate 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
Table 7.11. Revenue and tax payment of Microsoft Domains Norge AS. 
 The financing structure for this subsidiary has moved to debt from 2012, and hit the debt-to-
equity ratio of -1 in 2014. The debt was only short term debt, but there was no information 
whether this debt was internal or external one.  
MICROSOFT DOMAINS NORGE AS 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Long term debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Short term debt 0 0 0 4733 5,866 47,992 
Equity 74,300 53,200 17,959 -12,847 -35,492 -47,992 
Debt-to-equity ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.37 -0.17 -1.00 
Table 7.12. Debt Microsoft Domains Norge AS 
 
85 Financial report from Bronnøysundregistrene, 2012 
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Sub conclusion 
The analysis finds that both Microsoft Holdings Norge AS and Microsoft Domains Norge AS 
book only cost and do not have any revenue; it results in zero tax liabilities. Per 2014, the 
financing structure consisted only debt. It seems that Microsoft combines the allocation of 
operation cost in Norway and high leverage to these two subsidiaries for the purpose of tax 
minimisation, even though the amount involved is quite small. However, it is not clear how these 
two subsidiaries related to other Microsoft subsidiaries for tax minimisation purpose. Possible 
future development can lead to the utilisation of these two subsidiaries for cost allocation in order 
to capture the tax revenue in Norway. 
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8. TAX REGULATIONS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT  
There are tax regulations and actions to mitigate aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance. The 
aim is to align the tax paid with the real economic activities reducing the tax loss suffered by tax 
authorities in the countries where the economic activities are done.  
The relevant tax regulations and actions, especially for multinational companies, will be discus-
sed in this chapter. 
8.1. Debt shifting and thin capitalisation regulations. 
8.1.1. Thin capitalisation rules 
The way a company is capitalised affects the amount of profit reported, and thus the tax it pays. 
Therefore, rules limiting the amount of interest that can be deducted in calculation of a company's 
profit for tax purpose are introduced. The purpose is to impede profit shifting across border 
through excessive debt (OECD, 2012).  
 There are two approaches in TC rules: (a) using a maximum amount of debt on which 
deductible interest payments are available, and (b) using a maximum amount of interest that may 
be deducted by reference to the ratio of interest (paid or payable) to another variable (OECD, 
2012). Ruf and Schindler (2012) explain further that the TC rules can be applied in a specific and 
non-specific way. Specific TC rules directly tackle the use of internal debt, while non-specific TC 
rules do not only focus on internal debt, but confine the  use of debt in general. 
 The example of non-specific TC rules is earning-stripping rules restricting the deductibility 
of domestic interest expenses established in 1989 in the United States. The rules deny deductibi-
lity of "excessive" interest expenses exceeding 50 percent of a company's earnings  before 
interest, taxes, depreciations and amortisation (EBITDA) if debt-to-asset ratio is above a safe-
harbour86 of 1.5:1, and if excessive interest is paid to a related party outside the scope of the U.S. 
income tax.  Germany extended these rules in 2008, and since then has denied the deductibility of 
"excessive interest expenses" (regardless of whether paid on internal or on external debt) 
exceeding 30 percent of a company's EBITDA from the domestic tax base. Unlike the earning-
86 Safe-harbour ratio means that TC rules do not apply as the defined ration (e.g. debt-to-asset ratio) remains within 
the safe-harbour ratio. If the safe harbour ration is exceeded, TC rules deny the interest deductibility for excessive 
debt from shareholders with significant influence on management, i.e. shareholders having direct or indirect voting 
right amount to 25% or 50% depending on the regulation in each country. 
 
 
                                                          
84 
  
stripping rules, Germany dropped the use of safe-harbour. In 2008, the average safe-harbour ratio 
of internal debt-to-equity in EU countries was 3.4:1 (Ruf and Schindler, 2012). 
 From January 1, 2014, Norway has introduced the TC rules that limit the intra-group deduc-
tion to an amount equal to 30 percent of tax-adjusted EBITDA as discussed in part 3.6. The TC 
rules replaced the arm's length principle that was based on a case-by-case assessment. By using 
TC rules, the limitations encountered in the arm's length principle due to limited information and 
administrative cost can be reduced (Ruf and Schindler, 2012). 
 The application of TC rules is expected to limit international debt shifting and decrease the 
debt-to-asset ratio of domestic affiliates of multinationals. However, these benefits come with a 
cost of reduction in domestic investment, because TC rules increase the domestic cost of capital 
and negatively affect a country's position in competing internationally for mobile capital. It 
implies that the decrease in debt-to-asset ratio will increase the tax revenue, but the reduced 
investment will eventually have a negative effect on the tax revenue (Ruf and Schindler, 2012). 
8.1.2. Controlled-Foreign-Company Rules 
A potential alternative is CFC rules mentioned by Ruf and Schindler (2012). The rules prevent 
the application of tax-exemption rule as "passive income" is immediately being included in the 
corporate tax base of the multinational's headquarters if the income is generated from non-
productive activities and the multinational has an ownership of at least 50 percent. Thus, if CFC 
rules are applicable, passive income will be taxed at headquarter corporate tax rate regardless the 
location of the income is effectively accrued. 
 Further, the same authors mention that CFC rules do not adversely affect a country's position 
when competing internationally for mobile capital as the rules only affect the multinationals 
headquartered in the country where the CFC rules apply. However, they will harm the competiti-
veness of domestic multinationals relative to foreign competitors. 
 In the United States, similar rule is called "Subpart F". However, the issuance of Check-the-
box tax regulations and CFC Look-Through Rule has reduced the effectiveness of the Subpart F. 
(Levin and Coburn, 2012).  
8.1.3. Allowance for Corporate Equity and Comprehensive Business Income Tax. 
Traditional corporate income tax systems give tax advantage to debt over equity resulting in 
problems related to the preference of using debt. Therefore, there is a consideration in eliminating 
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the tax advantage of debt by using a fundamental tax reform. Two options are available: 
allowance for corporate equity (ACE) recommended by Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991) or 
enforce a comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) suggested by the U.S. Department of 
Treasury (1992) (Ruf and Schindler, 2012). 
 Ruf and Schindler (2012) explain that ACE system alters interest deductibility of debt with a 
notional deduction for equity employed equivalent to the "risk-free" rate of return. It taxes only 
economic ("supernormal") profits and leaves the normal rate of return on capital free of tax at 
firm level. ACE does not distort marginal investment, but when tax revenue effects and capital 
mobility are taken into account, the advantage of ACE becomes unclear. The use of ACE requires 
an increase in corporate tax rate or other taxes because ACE reduces the corporate tax base. For 
this reason, CBIT works better. CBIT denies tax deductibility of any financing cost, so that both 
the return on equity and the interest on debt are taxed at firm level at the corporate tax rate. This, 
unfortunately, will distort the marginal investment, but, on welfare grounds, CBIT enlarges the 
corporate tax base and allows for cutting taxes on other accounts. If the changes are done in the 
corporate tax rate, they can lead to lower effective average tax rate in the country where the CBIT 
is applied. This will attract multinationals, discrete investment and shifted profits. Both ACE and 
CBIT should decrease firms' leverage and eliminate debt shifting, as replacing equity by debt or 
shifting interest income to low-taxed affiliates does not reduce tax payments. Belgium and Italy 
have introduced the ACE system and showed a decrease in leverage by about three to five 
percent on median. 
8.1.4. Effect of debt shifting and thin capitalisation regulations 
The introduction of TC rules in Norway will have significant effect on multinationals both 
domestic and internationals operating in Norway. The rules will reduce firm's leverage in general 
and internal leverage in particular. The Norwegian tax authorities will be able to decide the 
eligibility for tax deduction on interest expenses of a firm faster and in a more simple way than 
using the case-to-case assessment. For Microsoft Norge AS, the limited data on the interest 
expenses makes it difficult to justify the direct effect of the TC rules applied. It is expected that 
Microsoft and other multinationals operating in Norway will reduce their internal leverage to 
avoid the additional cost as a consequence of exceeding the threshold.  
 The Subpart F should have had an effect on Microsoft tax liabilities for the intra-group 
transaction, but due to the possibility to form disregarded-CFC subsidiaries, the function of 
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Subpart F is neutralised. In this case, the U.S. government should find a solution in solving the 
problem.  
8.2. Profit shifting regulations 
Compared to TC rules, regulations about transfer pricing have its hard time especially in terms of 
the guidance for the arm's length principle. This is due to the development of the economy, pro-
duct types and business models that are steps forward compared to the existing regulations. This 
gap creates a situation where multinationals, especially the ones with focus on technology, can 
shift their profits and avoid taxes "legally".   
8.2.1. BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) 
BEPS refers to tax planning that exploits gaps in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-
tax locations where there is little or no economic activity, resulting in little or no corporate tax 
being paid. The gaps are the result of the inability of national tax laws to keep up with global 
corporations, movement of capital and the development of the digital economy (OECD, 2012). 
 To address this challenge, 15 specific actions are being developed in the context of the 
OECD to equip government with needed domestic and international instruments. The first of 
measures and reports were launched in September 2014 and were expected to be completed in 
2015. In February 2015, OECD and G20 countries agreed on three key elements to enable the 
implementation of the BEPS Project. This will give countries the tool to make sure that profits 
are taxed in the location where economic activities generating the profits are performed and 
where the value is created (OECD, 2012). 
 One of the central motivations here is the desire to align a multinational company’s profits 
with value creating activities. The focus is the intangible assets that often are a value key driver. 
From a legal perspective, the intangible assets can be owned anywhere. However, the flow of 
income to the legal owner resided in a low-tax jurisdiction is considered inappropriate in general. 
Therefore, OECD is trying to find a certain category in developing protection and exploitation of 
intangibles. This process aims to reduce and prevent the profit shifting to the control party loca-
ted in low-tax jurisdiction through transfer pricing (Dykes, 2014). For Microsoft, this will affect 
the business strategies that they have at the moment as they will no longer able to shift the profits 
to the tax havens. Most of the profits will be forced to be booked in the United States and other 
location where the R&D and other value creating activities are performed. 
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 There are still some challenges for OECD in forming the transfer pricing guidance. 
However, the combination of increased transparency in terms of the alignment of profits and 
operational substance, combined with OECD guidance and increased tax authority's awareness 
will put a pressure on the strategies that multinationals use for holding and exploiting their IPs 
(PWC, 2015a). Microsoft has been under the investigation of IRS on the issue of transfer pricing. 
Depending in the result of this investigation, they might be forced to change their cost sharing 
agreement and do the transactions between its subsidiaries using price that follows the arm's 
length principle. 
8.2.2. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) 
FATCA was enacted in March, 2010 by Congress to target tax non-compliance by U.S. taxpayers 
using foreign accounts. It focuses on reporting by U.S. taxpayers about certain foreign financial 
account and offshore assets (U.S. IRS, 2015a). It requires foreign financial institutions (FFIs) to 
report to the IRS information about financial accounts held by U.S taxpayers, or by foreign 
entities in which U.S. taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest (U.S. Department of The 
Treasury, 2014). If the FFIs do not enter into an agreement with the U.S tax authorities to provide 
such information, payment with American source will be deducted by 30 percent of U.S. tax 
(Skatteetaten, n.d.). 
 Norway and the United States signed the agreement on improved international observance 
and the tax liability and the implementation of FATCA on April 15, 2013 and it has been applied 
since July 1, 2014. It implies that Norwegian financial institutions have to identify U.S. account 
holders and report account information to the Norwegian tax authorities to be sent forward to the 
U.S. tax authorities (Skatteetaten, n.d.). Norwegian institutions covered by the rules must register 
with the U.S. tax authorities (IRS) before January 1, 2015 to be awarded a global identification 
number (GIIN) and be listed on the list of participating financial institutions (Finans Norge, 
2014). 
 Internationally, the focus on tax evasion and efforts to prevent this practise is increasing. 
While FATCA only applies to Americans, there are also international agreement on automatic 
exchange of tax information within OECD, EU and G20 (Finans Norge, 2014). In October 2014, 
the Council of the EU (ECOFIN) reached an agreement on a revised directive in the field of 
taxation that expands the scope of the automatic exchange of tax information including interest, 
dividends and other income as well as account balances and sales from financial assets. This 
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"European FATCA" will be effective per January 1, 2016, with the first exchange of information 
will be in 2017 (except for Austria). The Luxembourg government has decided to commit to this 
directive. The question will be on the effects of this reform for the taxation in Luxembourg 
(KPMG, 2014). Formalisation of the tax clearance process will create extra cost for taxpayers to 
compensate the process done by tax authorities. Regarding transfer pricing, the article 56 of the 
Luxembourg Income Tax Law will be amended in order to comply more explicitly with the arm's 
length principle that will be applied for both resident and non-resident parties. Further, companies 
involved in intra-group transactions will be required to provide detailed general information and 
documentation on transfer pricing. If the transactions do not meet the arm's length principle, the 
profits generated will be determined in accordance with normal market conditions and taxed 
accordingly (EY, 2014). 
 Bermuda as a tax haven signed IGA Model 2, the alternative agreement on implementation 
of FATCA in December 2013 (PWC, 2015b). However, if the Bermuda holding company is like 
the one in Cayman Islands which is not an FFI, FATCA will have no effect on this entity 
(Conyers Dill and Pearman, 2015). It implies that Microsoft's holding companies registered in 
Bermuda will be non-financial foreign entities (NFFEs) for the purpose of FATCA. They are not 
subject to registration or reporting requirements, but they will be required to self-certify their 
status to financial institutions and other withholding agents with whom they maintain accounts to 
avoid FATCA withholding. However, in general, FATCA will increase the transparency of the 
assets owned by U.S. multinationals, including Microsoft. This will give easier access for the 
U.S. tax authorities to put pressure on the U.S. multinationals to comply with the U.S. tax 
regulations.  
8.3. Tax transparency 
8.3.1. Tax Transparency Package 
Linked to the agenda to tackle tax fraud and evasion, the European Commission has a priority to 
fight against corporate tax avoidance where the important element is tax transparency. At the 
moment, the level of this transparency is low. It leads to the practice of tax avoidance 
unchallenged. The lack of information on the impact of one country's tax regimes on the others is 
often unknown, and therefore, the possible loopholes in national tax regimes are often unnoticed.  
 To increase the tax transparency, on March 18, 2015, the Commission introduced Tax 
Transparency Package with key element of automatic exchange of information between Member 
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States of their tax rulings. A tax ruling is a confirmation given by tax authorities to taxpayers on 
how their tax will be calculated. Rulings are not problematic, and granting them is not illegal or 
against EU law, but problems can arise if the tax rulings facilitate or even incentivise aggressive 
tax planning. 
 The proposal requires national tax authorities to send a short report to all other Member 
States on all advance cross-border tax rulings and advance transfer pricing arrangements that they 
have issued. This should be done in every three months. There are other tax initiatives: assessing 
the feasibility of new transparency requirements for companies, such as the public disclosure of 
certain tax information by multinationals; reviewing the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation 
to make it more effective and transparent tax competition; repealing the Savings Tax directive to 
prevent any legal uncertainty for tax authorities and businesses, and; quantifying the scale of tax 
avoidance and evasion to help in making better policy against it (European Commission, n.d.a). 
8.3.2. Country-by-country reporting. 
Multinational companies are able to exploit loopholes in domestic and international tax laws to 
shift profits from one country to another, often using tax haven, with a goal to reduce or even 
eliminating tax liabilities. It can be done due to the lack of clear and transparent information 
about the operation of these multinationals. They report profits, revenue, taxes paid, number of 
employees and subsidiaries, but this is done in a consolidated level, so that it is almost impossible 
to understand their operation in a specific country (Financial Transparency Coalition, n.d.). 
 Country-by-country reporting (CBCR) makes multinational corporations break down their 
results for each country. This is essential for transparency requirement so that citizens in each 
country know what the multinational corporations and their affiliates are doing in the country. 
CBCR requires each multinational corporations to provide information about the name of each 
country it operates, the name, performance and tax charge of all its subsidiaries and affiliates, 
details of the cost and net book value of its fixed assets and details on its gross and net assets in 
each country. As most countries use International Accounting Standards, it is a cost-effective 
route to create a change in global corporate transparency with benefits that are beyond the tax 
purpose. CBCR will make transfer price manipulation, if exists, clear.  
 As mentioned in chapter 6 and 7, the limitation of financial information in each country 
where Microsoft operates makes it difficult to perform the analysis needed to show the proof of 
aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance. The subsidiaries, especially the ones located in the tax 
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havens are granted for exemption in submitting their financial report. In addition, the tax havens 
protect their secrecy in terms of ownership and assets. Without any information of these subsi-
diaries, it would be impossible to know about the subsidiaries' activities and compliance. In terms 
of tax avoidance, it is impossible to quantify the tax revenue loss for countries affected. Microsoft 
does not provide any financial information in their operation centres, the places where the profits 
are concentrated. Relying only on the consolidated annual report they present would be 
impossible to know what they do exactly in these operation centres. The enforcement of CBCR 
will reveal the true activities of these subsidiaries.  
8.4. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) is a single set of rules that companies 
operating within the EU can use to calculate their taxable profit. The system was proposed by the 
European Commission on March 16, 2011 (European Commission, n.d.b). CCCTB is calculated 
using apportion mechanism with a three-factor formula: labour (consisting of equal weighted 
payroll and number for employees), assets (without intangibles and financial assets and 
inventory) and sales (measured "at destination").  Focusing on sales, it is mentioned that "sales by 
origin" could be easily manipulated because the place of shipment to third parties is easy to 
control. Similar risk is found in the "sales by destination". However, tax planning in this type of 
sales has less possibilities as companies cannot control the location of consumers as they can with 
the location of assets and employees (European Commission, 2007).  
 The concept of sales by destination is currently not in use for allocating taxing rights on 
corporate income among various jurisdictions. However, it can be argued that "demand" is an 
income generating factor since companies make profit only in so far as their output is sold. The 
role of a sales factor in the formula is to represent the demand side in the generation of income, 
and for that, it has to be measured at destination. The location is determined by the place where 
the sales to the third parties occur, i.e. final place of delivery.  
 Norway is a member of Single Market through EEA-agreement, but it is not an EU member. 
CCCTB limits the Member States within EU. This limitation of the territorial scope is described 
as "CCCTB water's edge" (European Commission, 2005). It implies that subsidiaries of 
Norwegian multinationals located within EU will be able to calculate their income on the basis of 
CCCTB rules, but subsidiaries of European multinationals located in Norway cannot do the same 
and will base the calculation on separate accounting approach (European Commission, 2011). 
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Thus, the CCCTB will not affect Norway directly unless special measures are taken to make it 
applicable, for example, through an agreement between EU and Norway (Hjort, J.B., Isaksen, K. 
and Lystad, R.S. in Lang et al, 2010). 
 If Norway enters such agreement with EU for the application of CCCTB, the apportion 
approach will affect the tax calculation for Microsoft Norge AS as the sales revenue in 
Norwegian market will be taxed in Norway following the "sales by destination" factor. As 
mentioned in the master thesis by Olsen and Høgalmen (2013), based on their discussion with 
Tax Justice Network, other technological multinationals doing sales through internet like Apple 
Inc. will also be affected. So far, their sales are taxed (if it is taxed at all) on the basis of "sales by 
origin" where the country of origin is often tax haven such as Ireland.  
8.5. The recent actions 
In October 2014, The Irish government decided to close one of the world's best-known corporate 
tax loopholes "Double Irish". Ireland will change its tax code and require all Irish-registered 
companies to be tax residents in Irelands (Schechner, 2014). From January 2015, Irish-registered 
firms will automatically be deemed to be tax resident in Ireland, bringing Irish law in line with 
U.S. and British rules. Companies already incorporated in Ireland will have until 2020 to comply 
with the new rules (Reuters, 2014). The decision came as a result of heavy pressure from other 
governments and the EU (Schechner, 2014). This change will definitely affect Microsoft as RI 
Holdings will have to be registered in Ireland for tax purpose and it will no longer be able to be 
used to channel the profits to Bermuda.  
 While EU is still pursuing new rules to end tax avoidance by multinational companies, it is 
further mentioned that Ireland would introduce measures to persuade international corporations to 
stay in Ireland and that it would not change its low 12.5 percent corporate tax rate. A patent box 
used by the U.K. and the Netherlands was mentioned as a possible alternative (Schechner, 2014). 
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9. CONCLUSION  
The thesis has explained various tax minimisation strategies, i.e. deferral, transfer pricing, check-
the-box, thin capitalisation, advance company structure and the use of tax havens, that multi-
national companies use, both internationally and within Norway. The tax regulations and recent 
actions to prevent and reduce aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance and how they will affect 
multinational (in particular technological) companies in the United States and in Norway have 
also been discussed. 
 By analysing the relevant literature, there is empirical evidence that multinational companies 
use the aforementioned strategies for tax minimisation purpose. Deferral is used by many U.S. 
multinationals to avoid U.S. withholding tax. Transfer pricing and check-the-box go hand in hand 
in order to transfer IPs from the United States to the tax havens. Thin capitalisation is utilised to 
capture the positive tax saving due to tax rate differences. By using advanced company structure 
and tax havens, multinational corporations can shield the tax minimisation practice from the tax 
authority and from the public. This is due to the lack of transparency and the secrecy protection 
that is given by the tax havens.  
 Analysis of Microsoft international operation has shown that they deferred around 90 
percent of the foreign income in the operation centres in tax havens, avoiding U.S. withholding 
tax. Transfer pricing was used to shift profits to the IP-Holding entities in Ireland, Puerto Rico 
and Singapore through cost sharing agreement and "buy-in" payment. In this process, licence 
payment and check-the-box were used to transfer profit without paying U.S. tax for passive 
income. Advanced corporate structure with the use of shell and holding company in the tax 
havens (e.g. Double Irish Dutch sandwich) was used to shift the profits to Bermuda and Nevada. 
Regarding thin capitalisation, it was difficult to show its utilisation for tax minimisation purpose 
due to unavailable information.  
 Microsoft operation in Norway seemed to be used for tax minimisation purpose by allocating 
operating costs in Norway and booking only commission revenue that is based on the sales in 
Norway, instead of total sales in Norway itself. It might also be that Norwegian subsidiaries is 
used to transfer revenue from North America, avoiding U.S. tax rate. 
 Reviewing the corporate income and tax regulations, fighting against aggressive tax 
planning is the focus of international policy makers and national governments. More countries 
have applied the thin capitalisation regulations, including Norway.  ACE- and CBIT-systems are 
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intended to eliminate the incentive of using debt. BEPS Project and FATCA are focusing in 
preventing profit shifting. Transparency is an important criterion in the fight against the tax 
avoidance. Therefore Country-by-Country Reporting and Tax Transparency Package are impor-
tant in increasing the transparency of multinationals activity in each country the multinationals 
are operating in. It is proposed that the apportion mechanism used in CCCBT, particularly the 
one regarding factor formula "sales by destination", can have a real effect on curbing the tax 
avoidance by multinational technological companies. 
 Development and the effort to tackle tax avoidance combined with the pressure from govern-
ments and international organisations such as EU and OECD are met positively by some tax 
havens, e.g. Ireland and Luxembourg. However, there will still be other strategies that a country 
can offer to multinationals to attract them to invest in the country. The question is whether tax 
regulations are able to prevent any upcoming challenges in tax minimisation effort done my 
multinationals. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. 
Tax haven and related terms - designations by various institutions (NOU 2009:10, p.19-21)  
 OECD 2000 IMF 2008 US Senate Tax Justice Network 2007 
The Caribbean and Americas 
Anguilla 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Aruba 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bermuda 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Costa Rica 
Dominica 
Grenada 
Montserrat 
Netherlands Antilles 
New York 
Panama 
St Lucia 
St Kitts & Nevis 
St Vincent and the Grenadines 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
Uruguay 
US Virgin Islands 
Africa 
Liberia 
Mauritius 
Melilla (Spain) 
Seychelles 
São Tome é Principe 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Middle East and Asia 
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Bahrain 
Dubai  
Hong Kong 
Malaysia (Labuan) 
Lebanon 
Macau 
Singapore 
Tel Aviv 
Taipei 
Europe 
Alderney 
Andorra 
Belgium 
Campione d'Italia 
London 
Cyprus 
Frankfurt 
Gibraltar 
Guernsey 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Ingushetia 
Isle of Man 
Jersey 
Latvia 
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
Madeira (Portugal) 
Malta 
Monaco 
Netherlands 
San Marino 
Sark 
Switzerland 
Trieste 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
Indian and Pacific Ocean 
Cook Islands 
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Maldives 
Marianas 
Marshall Islands 
Nauru 
Niue 
Palau 
Samoa 
Tonga 
Vanuatu 
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x 
x 
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x 
x 
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x 
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Total 40 46 35 72 
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Appendix 2. 
Subsidiaries in Norway.87 
No Subsidiaries Status Type Financial data Owner Country 
1 Microsoft Norge AS Active IC Yes Microsoft Luxembourg International Mobile SARL 
Norway 
2 Microsoft Development 
Center Norway AS Active IC Yes 
Microsoft International 
Holdings B.V. 
US 
3 Microsoft Holdings Norge 
AS Active IC Yes 
Microsoft Corporation Norway 
4 Microsoft Domains Norge 
AS Active IC Yes 
Microsoft Corporation Norway 
5 Microsoft Corporation LTD Active  No Not disclosed Norway 
6 Microsoft Corporation Active  No Not disclosed Norway 
7 Microsoft Corporation Active  No Not disclosed Norway 
8 Microsoft Luxembourg 
International Mobile SARL Active IC No 
Not disclosed Norway 
9 Microsoft MSN Norge AS Dissolved  - - - 
10 Nordholmen Micro-soft Active  No Sole trader Norway 
11 Microsoft Subscription 
Centre Dissolved  - 
- - 
12 Microsoft Ireland 
Operations Ltd Active IC No 
Branch Norway 
13 Microsoft Advanced 
Network Users Society Dissolved  - 
- - 
14 Microsoft Server 2003 Geir 
Staele Dissolved  - 
- - 
15 Microsoft Global Resources Active 
(branch)  No 
Not disclosed - 
16 Microsoft technology User 
Group Active  No 
Not disclosed Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 Orbis database 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
Appendix 3. 
a. Revenue and tax payment of Microsoft Norge AS 2009-2014 (in NOK). 
MSFT NORGE AS 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Revenue from commission 588,762,974 600,751,442 556,220,288 595,973,879 626,494,225 503,670,742 
Provision  6 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 
Total sales  9,812,716,233 10,012,524,033 9,270,338,133 9,932,897,983 10,441,570,417 8,394,512,367 
Other revenues 110,584,328 144,449,039 134,369,733 140,882,975 183,907,991 152,475,821 
Total revenue 9,923,300,561 10,156,973,072 9,404,707,866 10,073,780,958 10,625,478,408 8,546,988,188 
Operating costs 521,029,871 580,360,920 575,392,959 631,772,609 653,356,787 489,318,476 
Net financial 38,246,946 27,266,517 9,865,322 8,454,487 6,481,319 8,217,229 
Taxable income 9,440,517,636 9,603,878,669 8,839,180,229 9,450,462,836 9,978,602,940 8,065,886,941 
Tax rate 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 27% 
Tax liabilities 2,643,344,938 2,689,086,027 2,474,970,464 2,646,129,594 2,794,008,823 2,177,789,474 
Tax paid 66,645,820 59,520,415 43,200,163 38,919,041 50,934,278 51,299,021 
Tax saving 2,576,699,118 2,629,565,612 2,431,770,301 2,607,210,553 2,743,074,545 2,126,490,453 
Reduction in tax liabilities 97.48 % 97.79 % 98.25 % 98.53 % 98.18 % 97.64 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Calculation formula  
MSFT NORGE AS Formula 
Revenue from commission (a) Annual report 
Provision (b) 6 % 
Total sales (c) 100 ÷ (b) * (a) 
Revenue from service (d) Annual repot 
Total revenue (f) (c) + (d) 
Operating costs (g) Annual report 
Net financial (h) Annual report 
Taxable income (i) (f) - (g) + (h) 
Tax rate (j) 27.83 %* 
Tax liabilities (k) (i) * (j) 
Tax paid (l) Annual report 
Tax saving (m) (k) - (l) 
Reduction in tax liabilities (m) ÷ (k) 
* average for year 2009-2004 
 
 
